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BUSH, OBAMA AND BEYOND:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF
FACT CHECKING EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT THREAT CLAIMS BEFORE
THE USE OF FORCE

Leslie Gielow Jacobs*

INTRODUCTION
Threats are scary. When they are real we should, of course,
as a Nation address them, with force if necessary. When they are
not, however, they should be exposed as what they are before
the use of force. But, as the Iraq War experience demonstrates
most recently, the fact checking that is essential to ensure the ac
curacy of executive department threat claims is not happening.
Rather, a pattern has developed whereby Presidents persuade
the Nati on to consent to the use of force based upon threat
claims for which they are effectively unaccountable until after
the decision has been made.1 Although presidents may legiti
mately advocate persuasively in support of their chosen policy,
the Constitution identifies the people, through Congress, as the
*
Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Thanks
to the following people for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Bill Banks, Anne Bloom,
Kathleen Clark, Michael Colatrella, Richard Collins, Heidi Kitrosser, Brian Landsberg,
Thom Main, Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Kevin Stack. Thanks to Matthew Downs,
Michael Claiborne and Rebecca Whitfield for excellent research assistance.
1. Whether or not the existence of these threats explained the administration's
push for war, they were the primary reasons for the use of force offered by the President
and other executive branch officials in their advocacy. See JOHN DIAMOND, THE CIA
AND THE CULTURE OF FAILURE 13 (2008) ("The Bush team genuinely believed that Iraq
had some banned weapons . . . . But the administration considered Iraqi weaponry to be
a manageable threat. The problem was the future and what Iraq might do with its oil
money once it was free from the crushing international sanctions."); see also Associated
Press, Wolfowitz Comments Revive Doubts over Iraq's WMD, USA TODAY, June 1 ,
2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-05-30-wolfowitz-iraq_x.htm ("[W]e
settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass de
struction as the core reason." (quoting Paul Wolfowitz)); S. REP . No. 110-345, at 1
(2008), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110345.pdf (reviewing executive
department threat claims and characterizing them as "central to the nation's decision to
go to war") .
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ones who must decide whether the president's choice is the right
one.2 That presidents can routinely make threat claims without
contemporaneous accountability represents a failure of democ
racy in the use-of-force decision making and oversight process,
since informed consent requires that the decision makers under
stand at least the basic facts upon which the President's pro
posed policy is based.
Part I sets out the experience of the last Administration's
use of inflated threat claims to persuade the country to consent
to the use of force in Iraq. Against this backdrop, Part II com
pares the current President's use of threat claims and the effec
tiveness of the mechanisms for fact checking his persuasive ad
vocacy in support of the use of force in Afghanistan. Although
the comparison must be imperfect, it supports the observation
that, while different office holders may make different choices,
the structures and incentives that have in the past allowed execu
tive branch officials to assert unverified threats as certain and
sufficient to justify the use of force have not changed significant
ly. While certain types of legal reforms could help to impose ac
countability on executive branch actors who make threat claims,
they are both unlikely to be enacted or, if enacted, to be effec
tively enforced, at least in the short term. In response to this re
ality, Part III proposes that some progress toward the elusive
goal of effective democratic use of force decision making can be
achieved by approaching the problem of potentially inflated ex
ecutive department threat claims from the other side of the
communication exchange. Several key recognitions about the na
ture of use of force advocacy and the secret intelligence informa
tion that executive branch actors may offer to support it, and
about the incentives of surrogates who can help interpret what
that information means, can help shore up listener defenses to
2. The Constitution grants Congress the power to "declare War" and other powers
that indicate the Framers intended it to actively oversee use of force decision making.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Congress's powers related to use of force policy making include:
" [To] provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," "To
declare War," "To raise and support Armies," "To provide and maintain a Navy," "To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. "). De
bates among the Framers reinforce the conclusion that this allocation of responsibility
reflects a considered judgment that, absent a sudden attack that requires immediate ac
tion, the deliberative processes of Congress should be the ones through which the con
sent of the people to use of force is obtained, and that such deliberation was to act as a
check on an eager, aggressive, and potentially persuasive executive. Louis Fisher, Un
checked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1 637, 1651 (2000). But see John C. Yoo,
The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Pow

CAL. L. REV.
itiate wars).
ers, 84

1 67 (1996)

(the framers intended that the President be able to in
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government speech, and specifically threat claims, and thereby
bolster the contemporaneous accountability of use of force ad
vocacy.
I. USE OF FORCE ADVOCACY, THREAT CLAIMS AND
THE LACK OF CONTEMPORANEOUS
ACCOUNTABILITY BEFORE THE IRAQ WAR
The Iraq War experience illustrates the government struc
tures, incentives, and behaviors that now unite in "perfect
storm" combination to lead to the result that executive branch
actors can make threat claims in support of the use of force for
which they are effectively unaccountable until after the policy
choice is made.
Aggressive and Persuasive Use of Threat Claims in Support
of the Use of Force. Modern presidents exist at the center of in
creasingly massive, multi-faceted communications machines.3 Al
though one purpose of executive branch communications is to
provide information to the public, a fundamental unabashed
purpose is to advocate for the President's policies. Engaging in
persuasive government speech is a crucial component of the ex
ercise of any President's constitutional authority. The President
enjoys an advocacy advantage over any other communicators in
the Nation, and, arguably, the world. He is a single person, and
can coordinate executive branch messages.4 He has a vast staff to
keep track of the many sources of information dispersal and to
keep them in line. Although one-sided and aggressive, persua
sive presidential speech is a legitimate and appropriate tool for
governing because the President, like other government speak
ers, operates under a democratic mandate to implement policies
through all legal and effective means, including speech, and he is
accountable to those he governs for the content of his speech.5
3. MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE 4-6 (2007)
(describing how the President's communication operations have grown through several
administrations).
4. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 865, 886 (2007) ("[T]he executive can act with much greater unity, force and dis
patch than can Congress, which is chronically hampered by the need for debate and con
sensus among large numbers.").
5 . Democratic accountability is the important attribute that distinguishes the Free
Speech Clause category of "government speech." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129
S. Ct. 1 125, 1 132 (2009) (noting that a government entity is ultimately "accountable to
the electorate and the political process for its advocacy" (quoting Board of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). While the Constitution limits government control
of private speech, government actors may engage in "government speech" that advocates
in favor of some and discriminates against other controversial viewpoints. Pleasant
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The President bears the constitutional responsibility to dis
cern threats to homeland security and to address them. 6 Like all
actions of a democratic government, the use of force should oc
cur with the consent of the governed to the President's proposed
policy, informed by an understanding of the facts that support
the choice. Consequently, Presidents may legitimately and ap
propriately advocate that immediate and grave threats to homel
and security exist for the purpose of persuading those he governs
to consent to the use of force.
In the year before the Iraq War, President Bush, in combi
nation with others in his Administration, used threat claims as
the primary component of a strategic and coordinated communi
cations campaign to build consent to his policy choice to use
force. These communications included formal speeches,7 media
interviews,8 congressional briefin�s,9 and documents delivered to
Congress and released publicly.1 In these communications, exGrove, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (government may "select the views that it wants to express").
"Accountability" means that the process by which the message is created is subject to
"political safeguards," and that a "politically accountable official" or politically account
able body is responsible for the content. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550,
563-64 (2005). Effective accountability means that the electorate can understand, eva
luate and react to government speech. Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1 132 ("If the citize
nry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary posi
tion. " (quoting Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235)). Enforcing structures of accountability is a
principle that underpins decisions with respect to other parts of the Constitution. See
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (line item veto); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (commandeering); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legis
lative veto).
6. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. U.S. CONST. art. II §
2, cl. 1 .
7. S. REP. No. 110-345, a t 5, available a t http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.
pdf (quoting President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address, in which he stated, "the
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quanti
ties of uranium form Africa") ; id. (quoting President Bush's speech in Cincinnati on Oct.
7, 2002, in which he stated that Saddam Hussein was "moving ever closer to developing a
nuclear weapon" and that Iraq "could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year").
8. James Gerstenzang, Bush Promises Postwar Aid if Hussein Toppled, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at 21 ("Delay, indecision and inaction are not options for America,
because they could lead to massive and sudden horror." (quoting President Bush)) . De
borah Orin, Iraq Slams the Door: Rejects New U.N. Orders on Weapons, N.Y. POST, Sept.
29, 2002, at 4 ("The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and year to
year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them." (quoting President Bush's Sept. 28
radio address)).
9. See H.R. Doc. No. 107-229 (2002) (in a statement made by President Bush to
the House of Representatives about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction he said
that nuclear activity in Iraq is believed to have continued since the UN inspections
stopped in December 1998); see also H.R. Doc. No. 107-175 (2002) (President Bush
urged for the deployment of troops against Saddam Hussein's "record of aggressive be
havior" in order to acquire Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, to protect Iraq's neigh
bors and protect the Kurds in the northern region).
10. See 145 CONG. REC. E1545-46, E1567 (statements of Rep. King) (including in
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ecutive branch officials repeatedly asserted as true that the Iraq
(1) possessed the weapons capacity to pose an actual and imme
diate threat to the security of neighboring nations and the Unit
ed States; (2) possessed means of delivering the existing weapons
into neighboring countries, and perhaps into the United States;
(3) was inclined to attack other countries, including the United
States; and (4) was offering support, including weapons, to non
nation terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, which perpe
trated the September 11, 2001 attacks.11 Various sources have
compiled the hundreds of these types of threat claims made by
Bush Administration officials during the lead-up to the Iraq
War.12 Examples include the following:
The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons,
is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the
British government, could launch a biological or chemical at
tack in as little as

45 minutes after the order is given.... This

regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material
13
could build one within a year.
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has
weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amass
ing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and
agamst us. 14
•

We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have high-level contacts that
go back a decade .... We've learned that Iraq has trained al
Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly
15
gases.
The Iraqi regime ... possesses and produces chemical and bi-

the record the unclassified version of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
that was delivered to Congress in classified version and released publicly in unclassified
form).
1 1. See S. REP. No. 1 10-345, supra note 1 .
12. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, IRAQ ON THE RECORD, 108th
CONG., REPORT ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ 5
(Comm. Print 2004); Charles Lewis & Mark Reading-Smith, False Pretenses, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY, Jan. 23, 2008, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/WarCard/ ("President
George W. Bush and seven of his administration's top officials, including Vice President
Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Do
nald Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false statements in the two years following September
11, 2001, about the national security threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.").
13. President George W. Bush, The President's Radio Address, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1656, 1 657 (Sept. 28, 2002).
14. Vice President Dick Cheney, Address to the National Convention of the Veter
ans of Foreign Wars (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://georgewbush
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html.
15. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati,
Ohio, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1716, 1717 (Oct. 7, 2002).
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ological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons ....We could
wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terror
ists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But
16
I'm convinced that is a hope against all evidence.

Additionally, executive department advocates strategically
planned their rhetoric and presentations to make use of "grip
ping images," such as the "smoking gun" that might be a "mu
shroom cloud,"17 the lump of material "a little larger than a sin
gle softball" that could become a nuclear weapon,18 and the vial
of "anthrax" wielded by Secretary of State Colin Powell to illu
strate the claims made in his United Nations Security Council
speech . 19
The Bush Administration presented facts about threats
posed by Iraq for the purpose of influencing the public discus
sion and conclusions about the policy the President advocated
and sought to have the Nation embrace. By presenting threats
posed by Iraq as actual, imminent, and potentially directed at the
homeland, the President and his advisors were able to argue that
war was a necessity not a choice.20 By means of threat claims, the
Administration was able to present the justifications for war as
simple and concrete, 21 and in terms that invoked patriotism22 and
16. S. REP. No. 110-345, supra note 1, at 4-5 (quoting President George W. Bush,
note 15, at 1716, 171 9).
17. RICHARD A. BEST, JR ., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND
POLICYMAKING 6 n.15 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS21696.pdf
(citing Barton Gellman & Walter Pincus, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evi
dence, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at Al); see also Bush Cites Saddam's 'Arsenal of Ter
ror', CNN, Oct. 8, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.iraq/
index.html ("Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof-the smok
ing gun-that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." (quoting George W.
Bush)); Wolf Blitzer, Search for the Smoking Gun, CNN, Jan. 10, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Ol/10/wbr.smoking.gun ("The problem here is that there
will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But
we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." (quoting Condoleeza Rice in
2002)) .
1 8 . President George W. Bush, supra note 1 5 , a t 1 7 1 8 ("If the Iraqi regime i s able
to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a sin
gle softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.").
19. See, e.g. , The Record on Curveball: Declassified Documents a n d Key Partici
supra

pants Show the Importance of Phony Intelligence in the Origins of the Iraq War, NAT'L
SECURITY
ARCHIVE,
Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB234/index.htm.
20. John M. Schuessler, Deception and the Iraq War 8-14 (Aug. 28, 2008), (unpub
lished paper presented at the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/7/9/1/1/p2791 13_index.
html see also Chaim Kaufmann, Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of
Ideas, 29 INT'L SECURITY 5, 7-8 (2004), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/kaufmann. pdf.
21. See Jeffrey M. Cavanaugh, From the 'Red Juggernaut' to Iraqi WMDs: Threat
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emotions,23 all important elements to garnering public support
for a complex and costly foreign commitment.
The Bush Administration's threat advocacy was designed to
build consent to the use of force and it did so. A chart produced
in a House Report records the number of statements about the
Iraq threat made by executive department officials sharply peak
ing in the several weeks before Congress voted to authorize the
President to use force.24 The Report of the House Committee on
International Relations explained that it embraced the executive
branch's factual assertions about the Iraq threat and based its
recommendation that the body vote to authorize the use of force
upon it.25 Individual House Members and Senators who had in
itially expressed reluctance to consent to the use of force ex
plained their votes in favor as based on their belief that the
threat claims advocated by the executive department were true.26
122 POL. Ser. Q. 555, 566 (2007)
("Apathy, ignorance, and the cost of acquiring quality sources of information are disin
centives mitigating public willingness to examine an administration's foreign policy in
detail."); see also John Zaller, Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion, in TAKEN BY STORM
186, 188 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds., 1994) ("Few members of the general
public should be expected to engage in independent thought and analysis on fo reign poli
cy issues. The most that can be expected is that they choose among competing elite and
media messages.").
22. One incentive to make threat claims is the "rally around the flag" bump in pub
lic popularity that Presidents tend to achieve when they forcefully confront an enemy.
JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 58-59 (1973). See also
Jane K. Cramer, Militarized Patriotism and the Success of Threat Inflation, in AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 135, 137 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K.
Cramer eds., 2009) (presenting extensive evidence, with respect to the Iraq War vote, to
support the claim that "most Democrats and many Republicans deferred to the executive
branch not on the merits of the case, but because they did not want to appear weak on
defense or unpatriotic"); George McGovern, Patriotism is Nonpartisan, NATION, Apr.1,
2005, at 30, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/patriotism-nonpartisan.
23. Advocacy that includes threat claims may be particularly potent because of the
public tendency to systematically overvalue low probability/high impact threats, such as
terrorism. Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1323-24
(2007) (making this argument in the context of official claims that speech will cause a
national security threat).
24. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, IRAQ ON THE RECORD, 108th CONG.,
REPORT ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ 5 (Comm.
Print 2004).
25. H.R. REP. No. 107-721 , at 7-8 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1001
("Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and
international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and
unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to
possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively
seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organiza
tions . . . . The continuing threat posed by Iraq is the motivation for the Committee's fa
vorable action on [the proposed joint resolution to authorize the use of force].").
26. See Thomas Oliphant, Op-Ed., Bush's Victory Cost Plenty, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 13, 2002, at Dll (reluctant Bush supporters Senators Chuck Hagel, John Kerry and
Inflation and How It Succeeds in the United States,
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Following the October 2002 votes by Congress to authorize the
use of force,27 the executive department continued to engage in
advocacy about the threat posed by Iraq. The President used his
January 2003 State of the Union address as a platform to advo
cate the multiple threats posed by Iraq,28 and in his February ad
dress to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary of State
Colin Powell presented detailed threat claims to the world.29
Public opinion polls indicate that these advocacy efforts moved
public opinion in favor of the use of force against Iraq.30 In par
ticular, public support for the use of force in Iraq correlated with
believing executive department threat claims.31
We know now that these threat claims were not true.32 In
stead, Congress and the American people gave their consent to
use of force in Iraq based at least in significant part upon inflated
threat claims.33 One source of threat inflation were the raw intel
ligence and assessments offered by parts of the intelligence
community, which grew increasingly urgent and dire over the
Hillary Rodham Clinton gave yes votes to the use of force by taking President Bush at
his word).
27. Alison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1 1 , 2002, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/
1 1/national/1 l IRAQ.html ?pagewanted=all.
28. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 28,
2003) available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu. transcript/.
29. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, Address to United Nations Security Council
(Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/.
30. Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 30. An October 2002 Pew Research Center Report
on public opinions noted "broad agreement that Saddam Hussein either already has or is
close to having nuclear weapons." Generations Divide over Military Action in Iraq, PEW
RESEARCH CTR ., Oct. 17, 2002, http://people-press.org/commentary/?analysisid=57. In
February 2003 Pew recorded that the combination of President Bush's State of the Union
address and Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations had
significantly moved United States public opinion in favor of military action against Iraq,
with four separate polls showing that a majority of Americans judged that the Bush ad
ministration had made a "convincing case." Powell Reversed the Trend but not the Tenor
of Public
Opinion,
PEW RESEARCH CTR . Feb. 14, 2003, http://people
press.org/commentary/?analysisid=62. But see GEORGE EDWARDS, ON DEAF EARS ix, xi
(2003) (reproducing Gallup Poll results to support his conclusion that in response to the
President's "rhetorical efforts" to support war in Iraq, "public opinion barely moved").
31. STEVEN KULL, MISPERCEPTIONS, THE MEDIA AND THE IRAQ WAR 2 (2003),
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct03/IraqMedia_Oct03_rpt.pdf.
32. See S. REP. No. 109-331 (2006).
33. Threat inflation "is the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes
beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify. Jane K. Cramer
& A. Trevor Thrall, Introduction, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF
FEAR 1, 1 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. Cramer eds., 2009). A simple model of the threat
inflation process proceeds as follows: "elites perceive threats, create communication
strategies to inflate threats, implement those strategies within the news media, or mar
ketplace of ideas, in an attempt to shape opinions and influence policy, and either suc
ceed or fail to do so." Id. at 2-3.
,
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course of the approximately 18 months between the September
2002 terrorist attacks and the beginning of the war against Iraq.34
The other source of threat inflation were the testimony, briefings
and public statements of executive department officials, who re
peatedly exaggerated the certainty, unanimity and imminence of
the Iraq threats beyond those held by the intelligence communi
ty.35 Observers differ as to the underlying reasons for the threat
inflation and the motivations of the executive branch officials
who engaged in it. 36 What is clear, however, is that the threat in
flation communications campaign engaged in by the President
and his close advisors to persuade Congress and the public to
consent to his policy choice resulted in a failure of democratic
governance. With the facts misunderstood, Congress members
and the public consented to the use of force based upon a fun
damental misunderstanding of the policy choice to be made.
And it is hardly the first time that this kind of misunders
tanding has occurred. Instead, executive department threat infla
tion to build consent to the use of force has become a bleak pat
tern - some might call it a "winning strategy" - identified by
many after the use of force and by some as it is ongoing, but not
enough to redirect the public debate and deliberation toward the
truth of the facts asserted and the real reasons that the executive
branch advocates war.37 It is not obvious that this pattern can be
34.

Joseph Cirincoine et al., WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, CARNEGIE
Jan. 2004.
35. See S. REP. No. 110-345 (2008), supra note 1 .
36. See Cramer & Thrall, supra note 22, at 1-2 ("To date scholars have offered a
wide range of arguments about why the Bush administration has sought to inflate threats
since 9/11 and Iraq in particular. Many observers insist that much of the threat exaggera
tion since 9/1 1 has been intentional, politically opportunistic and even self-serving. Oth
ers see the administration as sincere, led by long-held ideology to see the post 9/11 world
as extremely threatening. Some scholars point the finger at neoconservatives in key posi
tions; arguing that they pressed their worldview on the administration and hijacked the
decision-making process regarding Iraq. Others have argued that common psychological
short cuts in reasoning biased the threat perception process and most likely significantly
account for the widespread misperceptions among administration leaders and their fol
lowers. Still others find the threat inflation process likely to be at root politically moti
vated, but nonetheless primarily institutionally determined and perhaps even necessary
to exaggerate threats to enable bold foreign policy initiatives. Finally, a few scholars have
assessed the post 9/11 era and found simply a series of heightened fears, unavoidable in
telligence failures, and mistakes in judgment.").
37. See, e.g., JOHN QUIGLEY, THE RUSES FOR WAR 14 (1992) (documenting a pat
tern, since World War I, of executive department use of force advocacy that "omit[ted]
inconvenient details and exaggerated hazards"); see also The Executive Accountability
Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Crime Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ll lth
Cong. (2009), available at http://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/H.R. % 20743.testimony.
2009.pdf (statement of Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law, Law Library of the
Library of Congress); Id. app. A (documenting misleading justifications for war);
ENDOWMENT FOR lNT'L PEACE,
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broken. That it exists, however, suggests that understanding how
it happened, in its most recent incarnation, is the first step to
ward determining whether the current government structures,
incentives and behaviors create the possibility that it could hap
pen again. Obtaining this understanding requires identifying the
checks that were supposed to have been operating to render ex
ecutive department officials contemporaneously accountable for
their threat claims, and why these processes failed.
Information Control in Support of Threat Claims. One ac
countability check on executive department fact claims made in
support of advocacy stems from the free speech guarantee, and
the marketplace of ideas that it protects. Free speech leads to
contemporaneous accountability of executive department fact
claims according to a chain of assumptions and events because
other actors, in and out of government, have access to the facts
that bear upon the debate and have the incentive and ability to
publicly contest the President's claims. That this information is
available means that the President and his officials can be held
contemporaneously accountable for what they say. That they
understand that incorrect or incomplete fact claims can be ex
posed and if so, will undercut their credibility, dampens their in
centives to misrepresent facts intentionally or inadvertently, and
so encourages diligence and thoroughness in information gather
ing and assessment. Although most members of the public may
not grasp the details of the policy decision to be made or be able
or willing to verify the facts asserted independently, through de
bate filtered by credible experts they can understand the rele
vant facts and how they relate to the policy choice to be made,
and can reach opinions and express preferences on the broad
policy, which means that the laws that are made reflect the con
sent of those who are governed in this indirect way. 38
A barrier to achieving this kind of contemporaneous ac
countability for threat claims asserted by the executive depart
ment to build support for the use of force is its superior access to
and control over the intelligence information that forms the ba
sis of the claims. Collecting intelligence information relevant to
EUGENE SECUNDA & TERENCE P. MORAN, SELLING WAR TO AMERICA 1 (2007) ("[T]o
sell . . . wars, U.S. presidents regularly distort the truth and withhold crucial information
from the public, exploiting whatever media and marketing techniques are available at the
time. ").
38. JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992) (pro
posing the "elite discourse" model of public opinion formation discussed and applied
here in the Iraq War context).
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assessing threats to national security is a government activity.
Within the government, the intelligence agencies and military
departments that gather and analyze intelligence information are
under the direct control of the President.39 No other domestic
entity- not Congress, not the media, not private organizations has the ability to obtain intelligence information of the same vo
lume, quality and timeliness or to provide comprehensive as
sessments of comparable credibility and authority.40 The Presi
dent has the authority and responsibility to restrict public access
to intelliEence information for the purpose of protecting national
security. 1 To the extent that the President exercises his ability to
limit access to the facts that he uses to advocate for his use of
force policy,42 the free speech guarantee may be insufficient to
provide a contemporaneous accountability check on the threat
claims he makes.
Members of the Bush Administration exercised their ability
to control access to threat assessment information to support
their pro-war advocacy in two separate, but related, ways. First,
administration officials controlled release of the entire body of
39. See generally Intelligence.gov, http://intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence
community/ (setting out the structure of the intelligence community).
40. Memorandum from Alfred Cumming, Specialist in Intelligence and Nat'l Sec.,
Cong. Research Serv., to Senator Dianne Feinstein (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm (the President and his most senior advisors have
access to more and better intelligence, and they are better positioned to judge its quality
and to request that inconclusive information be expanded or supplemented). In particu
lar, Congress does not have access to the President's Daily Brief, or to the meeting in
which it is presented, which allows the President "full access to intelligence community
officials and provides a set time each day when he can ask senior intelligence officials
about the basis for their judgments." Walter Pincus, Lawmakers Focus on Daily Brief In
Prewar Intelligence Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2005, at AS, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/1 1/18/AR20051l1802578.
html. A member of the Senate Intelligence Committee confirms that intelligence agen
cies do not readily volunteer information. To get it, "you have to ask the right questions."
Dana Priest, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, WASH. POST, Apr. 27,
2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A448372004Apr26?language=printer (quoting Sen. Mike DeWine).
41. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (2009) (titled as "Classified Na
tional Security Information," prescribing "a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding,
and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense
against transnational terrorism,'' which includes classification of information pertaining
to "intelligence sources or methods"); KEVIN R. KOSAR, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
POLICY AND
PROCEDURE:
E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED (2009), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/97-771_20091231 .pdf (describing the history of the classifi
cation system and the changes in President Obama's executive order).
42. The ability of the President and executive department agencies to classify in
formation and prevent its release may extend well beyond their actual authority to do so.
See, e.g. , NAT ' L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE U.S., 9/1 1 COMMISSION
REPORT 417, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf ("Current se
curity requirements nurture overclassification.").
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threat assessment information to which they had access so that
the information presented to Congress, the media and the public
did not accurately reflect the contents of the information within
their control, but instead supported the use of force policy.
Second, administration officials controlled the process by which
raw intelligence was collected and analyses produced so that the
content of the information within their control changed, to more
robustly support the use of force policy.
The President and his top officials relied on controlled in
formation release in a number of ways to support their use of
force advocacy. That they withheld much information within
their control meant that they could rely upon the public's know
ledge that they had superior access to the entire body of existing
information to characterize the facts with greater certainty than
the content of the information reflected, to omit mention of dis
sent, to suggest that they had more and better quality informa
tion than they presented, and to ask the public to embrace the
truth of the threat claims based on trust rather than proof.43 They
selectively released pieces of raw intelligence that supported
their claims,44 without disclosing that intelligence experts disa
greed about whether the evidence was significant or whether its
source was credible.45 They did not release raw intelligence or in
telligence community assessments that undercut their argument
that Iraq presented an immediate threat.46 Top officials who had
43.

Elisabeth Bumiller & James Dao, Eyes On Iraq; Cheney Says Peril of A Nuclear
Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/27/world/eyes-on-iraq-cheney-says-peril-of-a-nuclear
iraq-justifies-attack.html ?pagewan ted=all (" [T]here is no doubt that Saddam Hussein
now has weapons of mass destruction . . . . [T]here is no doubt that he is amassing them to
use against our friends, against our allies and against us." (quoting Vice President Che
ney)) .
44. See Louis Fisher, Deciding o n War Against Iraq, 118 POL. SCI. Q. 389, 401
(2003) (describing selective declassification of satellite photographs purportedly demon
strating that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program); see also Murray Waas, Cheney
'Authorized' Libby to Leak Classified Information, NAT'L J., Feb. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stori�s/2006/0209nj1.htm ("Vice Presi
dent Dick Cheney's former chief of staff, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, testified to a federal
grand jury that he had been 'authorized' by Cheney and other White House 'superiors' in
the summer of 2003 to disclose classified information to journalists to defend the Bush
administration's use of prewar intelligence in making the case to go to war with Iraq.").
45. See S. REP. No. 108-301, at 28-29 (2004), available at http://intelligence.senate.
gov/108301.pdf (finding that the Director of Central Intelligence did not present dissent
ing views within the intelligence community about the significance of evidence purpor
tedly demonstrating Iraq's ongoing efforts to create nuclear weapons to executive de
partment policy makers); Joby Warrick, Evidence on Iraq Challenged; Experts Question
if Tubes Were Meant for Weapons Program, WASH . POST, Sept. 19, 2002, at A18.
46. In the early months of 2002, executive officials investigated suspicions that Iraq
had attempted to obtain weapons grade uranium from Niger, including sending an emisIraq
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iterated facts that did not support administration policy came to
embrace the alternative facts and articulate them publicly.47 In
telligence analysts did not generally dissent publicly.48 Those who
spoke out �enerally did so anonymously, which undercut their
credibility.4 Members of the executive branch enlisted private
experts as "message multipliers," providing selective access to
facts and policy so they could rearticulate them "in the form of
their own opinions" when they appeared as "independent" me
dia analysts.50 Officials also multiplied their own message by
quoting information reporters had obtained from their own of
fice and published as if it were an independent source.51 Addi
tionally, Bush Administration officials delayed delivery of the
information that they chose to release, which allowed the unre
butted executive department threat claims to become cemented
in the public minds and made it difficult for members of Con
gress to effectively use the information to assess and challenge
executive degartment advocacy before the vote to authorize the
use of force.
sary to the country to investigate. Although the information that returned did not sup
port the executive department's suspicions, it did not publicly release it. Walter Pincus,
CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid, WASH.
POST, June

12, 2003, at A l .
47. Zachary Colie, Powell to Leave Cabinet-Rice Likely t o Move Up , S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 16, 2004, at Al ("During the build-up before the war, [Powell] urged the president
to allow time for U.N. weapons inspectors to work and to build a broader coalition
against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein . . . . Despite his private disagreements, he staunchly
defended the war. Powell went before the United Nations Security Council in February
2003 to make the administration's case that Hussein was concealing weapons of mass de
struction."); Barbara Slavin & John Diamond, Case is Stronger When 'Biggest Dove'
Makes It, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2003, at lOA (reporting Powell's UN speech).
48. Mark Phythian, Intelligence Analysis Today and Tomorrow, 5 SECURITY
CHALLENGES 67, 73-74 (2009), available at http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/
vol5no1Pythian.pdf (noting the failure of intelligence agencies to include dissenting views
internally).
49. S. REP. No. 108-301 , supra note 45, at 357.
50. See David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2008, at Al , available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html
(these private experts acknowledged that they sometimes repeated inflated threat
claims) .
51. See Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us, N.Y. Rev. OF BOOKS, Feb. 26, 2004,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/feb/26/now-they-tell-us/ (recounting how
administration officials appearing on Sunday morning talk shows referred to information
about Iraq's alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons that appeared in a front page New York
Times story and that originated in the executive department as if it were independently
corroborated information); Michael R. Gordon & Judith Miller, Threats and Responses:
The Iraqis; U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A -Bomb Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2002, at Al.
52. See S. REP. NO. 109-331, supra note 32, at 13-15 (describing process by which
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction was requested and created).
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Members of the Bush Administration also used their control
over the agencies and people who gather and analyze intelli
gence information to influence the content of the raw informa
tion gathered and the threat assessments to support their use of
force policy. Most basically, executive department officials re
peatedly suggested in their advocacy that intelligence informa
tion and assessments were driving policy conclusions, when the
reverse appears to have been the case.53 At the very least, mem
bers of the Bush Administration did not encourage the indepen
dent and thorough intelligent gathering and analysis that can be
expected to produce the most accurate threat assessments.54
They did not challenge analysts to break out of the "group
think," and "mindset," and poor tradecraft practices that had led
to past intelligence failures, including the very recent failure to
discover and prevent the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks, and which the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found to have caused
the Iraq misjudgments.55 Instead, executive department officials,
particularly the Vice President, aggressively prodded intelligence
analysts to discover information and provide threat assessments
that would substantiate threat claims and support the use of
force.56 In addition, these officials established a new group within
the Pentagon to review intelligence data and produce and pro
vide to the President "alternative intelligence assessments" em
phasizing the Iraq threat.57 Two bipartisan reports concluded
53. Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Mar./ Apr. 2006, at 15; see also MELVIN A. GOODMAN, FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE 22552 (2008).
54. See GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM 361-63 (2007) (describ
ing a December 2002 briefing with the President in which he presented evidence of Iraq's
weapons' capacity: "At no time did [the President] or anyone else in the room suggest
that we collect more intelligence to find out if the WMD were there or not."); see also S.
REP. No. 108-301, supra note 45, at 23 ("In each instance where the Committee found an
analytic or collection failure, it resulted in part from a failure of Intelligence Community
managers throughout their leadership chains to adequately supervise the work of their
analysts and collectors. They did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions,
fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or
counsel analysts who lost their objectivity. ").
55. S. REP. No. 108-301, supra note 45, at 15, 20.
56. See, e.g.' SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/1 1
TO ABU GHRAIB 228 (2004) ("Senior CJ.A. analysts dealing with Iraq were constantly
being urged by the Vice President's office to provide worst-case assessments on Iraqi
weapons issues.").
57. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF
PRE-IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2 (2007), available at http://ftp.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ig020907.pdf (" [T]he
actions were . . . inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence
products and did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence
Community. ").
FOR POLICY
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that the intelligence analysts were not pressured by Administra
tion offi�ials to conform their conclusions to fit the war policy.58
Others have observed, however, that more subtle influences,
that are more difficult to measure, likely conformed intelligence
information and conclusions to support administration policy,59
and some agencies, at least, have bureaucratic incentives to ad
vocate that threats exist.60
Incomplete Oversight of the Accuracy of Fact Claims. Selec
tive presentation of facts by executive department advocates for
the purpose of persuading Congress and the public to consent to
policy occurs with respect to any decision framed for debate.
With respect to most issues, however, executive department offi
cials present their facts subject to motivated and aggressive over
sight. Members of Congress, particularly of the opposite political
party, journalists and media commentators, and private interest
groups and entities usually have the incentive and ability to
check the fact claims that executive branch officials assert in
support of policy. The executive branch information control de
scribed above impacts the ability of all of these sources to en
gage in effective oversight of threat claims. But access is not the
only barrier to effective oversight. Incentives, too, may be
skewed when the President makes threat claims to persuade
Congress and the public to consent to the use of force, and ap
pear to have been skewed in the lead-up to the Iraq War.
On paper, and written into the Constitution specifically,
Congress has special authority to cut through executive branch
secrecy to oversee the fact claims made to persuade it and the
58.

S.

REP.

No. 108-301(2004)

supra

note 45, at 357; THE

COMMISSION ON THE

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES 11 (2005), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf.
59. See Joseph Cirincione et al., supra note 34, at 51 (it "strains credulity" to believe
that the environment created by Bush Administration activities did not cause intelligence
analysts to feel pressure to produce threat information); Warren P. Strobel, Some in
Bush Administration Have Misgivings About Iraq Policy, McCLATCHY, Oct. 7, 2002,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/128/story/8592.html (multiple intelligence analyst sources
felt "under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's argu
ment[s] " ) ;see also Paul R. Pillar, supra note 53 (listing multiple ways more subtle than
arm twisting by which intelligence was politicized in the lead up to the Iraq War); Cava
naugh, supra note 21, at 567 ("The Department of State and the CIA may be less inclined
to present hawkish information [than the Department of Defense], but their institutional
relationship with the president and Congress and their small size give them few resources
with which to sustain opposition.").
60. Cavanaugh, supra note 21, at 567 ("Since perception of threat is correlated with
department budgets, prestige, and opportunities in the private sector, many bureaucrats
have incentives to cooperate [with executive department threat inflation] in order to ad
vance either department or personal interests.").
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public to consent to the use of force.61 With respect to the facts
that form the basis of executive department advocacy, Congress
has the power to oversee the intelligence collection and analysis
processes, to require evidence and testimony from intelligence
officials to explain the meaning of information gathered and the
conclusions reached, and to review highly secret raw information
that relates to its oversight responsibilities.62 Practical obstacles
exist to Congress achieving parity with the executive branch in
obtaining, understanding and reaching judgments about intelli
gence information that bears on threat assessments.63 Still, Con
gress's oversight efforts routinely fall short of what it could prac
tically achieve.64 Critiques of Congress's failure to exercise the
authority that it has to engage in effective ongoing intelligence
agency oversight, and to diligently exercise its authority to con
sent to and oversee the use of force, abound.65 Reasons that ex
plain this pattern of neglect by Congress help to explain why it
failed to effectively fact check executive department threat
claims with respect to Iraq. These include the complexity and
work load of intelligence oversight, the President's superior
access to intelligence information and expert analysis, and the
lack of public visibility of the work.66 Observers note that the rise
of partisanship and the decline of individual work ethics lower

61. US CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (Congress has the power to declare war); Louis
Fisher, Congressional Access to National Security Information, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
219 (2008).
62. S. REP. No. 108-301, supra note 32, at 7 ("The vast majority of intelligence
products are available to Congress."); CRS, CONGRESS AS A CONSUMER OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (2009) (Congress routinely has access to finished intelli
gence products and information provided in briefings; although it does not have routine
access to raw intelligence, it has obtained it upon request).
63. See Loch K. Johnson, Governing in the Absence of Angels 1 6-19 (May 9, 2003),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/johnson.doc (unpublished paper
presented to the Wilson Center Congress Project) ("Lawmakers now have, in theory at
least, access to all information that the secret agencies provide to the executive branch,
with the exception of the President's Daily Brief. In reality, Congress frequently has to
throw a fit before the agencies are responsive.").
64. Anne Joseph O 'Connell, The A rchitecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9111 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1671-73 (2006).
65. See, e.g. , Denis McDonough et al. , No Mere Oversight, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS,
June
13,
2006,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/06/
bl761097.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Wrestling Over War Powers, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2008,
at 18, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/145866 (observing that, with respect to
war powers, many view Congress as a "constitutional bathmat").
66. O'Connell, supra note 64, at 1660-63; McDonough et al., supra note 65, at 2728; Tim Poemer, Watching the Watchers: The Challenge of Intelligence Oversight, CTR.
FOR NATIONAL POLICY, June 1 , 2007.
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the incentives of members to work hard and in a bipartisan way
to oversee executive action regardless of party alignment.67
In addition to these incentives generally, the Iraq expe
rience reveals that the process of executive department decision
making and advocacy can impact the incentives and practical ab
ilities of Congress members to fact check administration threat
claims. It is not clear exactly when the President made the deci
sion to use force against Iraq.68 What is clear is that the question
was not framed for decision by Congress until late summer
2002.69 By that time, the Administration had made its decision,
lined up England as an ally, and planned and begun implement
ing a comprehensive strategic marketing campaign to persuade
Congress members and the public to consent to the use of
force.70 The President pressed Congress members to deliberate
and decide quickly, during the two months between their return
from summer recess and their break for the mid-term elections.71
During this time, executive branch officials engaged in an ag
gressive and targeted communications campaign aimed at con
vincing Congress members, and particularly key opinion leaders
in both parties, that the threat claims were true.72 These efforts
67. See, e.g. , THOMAS E. MANN AND NORMAN J. 0RSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH
(2006) (noting the rise of partisanship and the "Tuesday to Thursday" schedule general
ly).
68. John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, Op-Ed., Keeping Saddam Hussein in
a Box, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2003, at 4-15, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/02/02/opinion/02MEAR.html?scp=l&sq=Mearsheimer%20Feb. %202, % 20200
3&st=cse; Memorandum from Matthew Rycroft to David Manning (July 23, 2002) (he
reinafter Downing Street Memo), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/uk/article387374.ece.
69. The President initially claimed that he did not need Congress' consent to use
force. Michael Powell, Appeals Court Weighs Bush's War Powers, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2003, at A14. In September of 2002, he changed his mind. Christopher Marquis, Threats
and Responses: Congressional Memo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at Al7 (the White
House submitted a resolution to Congress seeking approval for the use of "all means that
[the President] determines to be appropriate, including force").
70. See Warren P. Strobel & John Walcott, Bush Has Decided to Overthrow Hus
sein, McCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, Feb. 13, 2002; Downing Street Memo, supra note 68
(about information to be fixed around WMD); Joseph Cirincione, Not One Claim was
True, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 65, 66 (reviewing JOHN
PRADOS, HOODWINKED: THE DOCUMENTS THAT REVEAL How BUSH SOLD Us A War
(2004)) (the White House Information Group was set up by Chief of Staff Andrew H.
Card and chaired by Karl Rove in August 2002 to coordinate the campaign to convince
Americans to go to war in Iraq).
71. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses Iraq, Domestic
Agenda with Congressional Leaders (Sept. 18, 2002), available at http://georgewbush
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020918-l.html ("I want to thank
the leadership for its commitment to get a resolution done before members go home for
the election break.").
72. MICHAEL ISIKOFF & D AYID CORN, HUBRIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF SPIN,
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included a speech by the President before the United Nations
General Assembly73 and to the Nati on on the first anniversary of
the September 1 1 terror attacks with a flood lighted Statue of
Liberty as the backdrop,74 other public statements by other offi
cials,75 documents detailing the threats,76 and classified hearings
and briefings at which officials presented specific pieces of evi
dence as undisputed and proving that Iraq posed a real and im
mediate threat.77 These presentations were one-sided, in support
of administration advocacy, and designed to reduce the incen
tives of Congress members to engage in extensive fact checking.78
The Administration delayed delivery of the most balanced in
formation it presented to Congress, producing it only upon re
quest by Senate committee members and not until three days be
fore the vote.79 While the 92 page classified version was difficult
for Congress members to access and understand,80 the short, un
classified summary, which did not contain the balanced informa
tion of the secret version, was freely available, to members, their
(2006).
President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations (Sept. 12, 2002),
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.transcript/.
74. President George W. Bush. Address on Sept. 1 1 , 2002 (Sept. 1 1 , 2002), available
at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/09/l 1/ar91 l . bush.speech. transcript/index.html.
75. See S. REP. No. 1 10-345, supra note 1 (outlining many statements by Bush offi
cials that were later proven to be false).
76. See, e.g. , A DECADE OF DECEPTION AND DEFIANCE; SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2002) (this served a s President Bush's background
paper for his September 12th speech to the United Nations General Assembly).
77. See ISIKOFF & CORN, supra note 72, at 124-26 (describing briefings).
78. In a statement several months later, the President's press secretary captured the
gist of the mindset that the executive branch sought to instill through its advocacy efforts:
"The president of the United States and the secretary of defense would not assert as
plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not
true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it." David E. Sanger, Threats and
Responses: Inspections; U.S. Tells Iraq It Must Reveal Weapons Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2002, at Al (quoting White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer).
79. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled "Iraq's Continu
ing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' was produced in a rapid timeframe at
the request of the Senate Committee on Intelligence. See S REP. No. 108-301, supra note
45, at 12-14 (describing requests by multiple members of the committee). An NIE is "an
appraisal of a foreign country or international situation . . . reflecting the coordinated
judgment of the entire intelligence community." Loch K. Johnson, An Appraisal of the
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 1950-2005 6 (Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished paper
presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association). Nei
ther the Director of Central Intelligence nor any executive official had requested that
one be produced prior to seeking congressional authorization to use force in Iraq.
80. Three days before the votes in Congress occurred, the classified NIE was made
available to members of Congress in a secured location. Members were required to sign
for access to the document. They could not take staff with them into the secure room,
they could not remove the document from the room, and they could not take notes.
Records indicate that very few members of Congress viewed the full document. Priest,
supra note 40.
SCANDAL, AND THE SELLING OF THE WAR

73.
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staff, the media and the public. 81 Although the public document
was accessible, its release so close in time to the votes in Con
gress diminished the ability of members of the media or private
entities to analyze the advocacy piece, identify its weaknesses
and publicize them in a way that could increase the incentives of
Congress members to look more critically at the evidence pre
sented by the Administration. Although not insurmountable,
this sequence of rushed congressional fact finding and decision
making after the President had already made his decision and
planned and embarked on his persuasive advocacy campaign
presented an obstacle that reduced both the incentives and prac
tical abilities of Congress members to fact check executive de
partment threat claims.
Partisan and electoral considerations can usually be ex
pected to motivate members of the opposite party to resist ag
gressive executive department advocacy, and to take the time
and engage in the effort required to check and contest the facts
the President asserts in support of policy. But when those facts
support threat claims in support of the use of force, experience
indicates that these incentives may operate differently. For a
number of reasons, threat claims are easier to make than they
are to oppose.82 Voters reward leaders who make threat claims
and carry through with a successful use of force. 83 Politicians who
question threat claims and prevent the use of force do not gen
erally receive the same magnitude of electoral reward. 84 In fact,
politicians perceive that voters punish those who oppose a use of
force that turns out to be successful. 85 These political incentives
specific to threat claims likely contributed to the decisions of a
number of Congress members not to examine the evidence pre
sented by Bush Administration officials more aggressively, to

81.

SENATE

COMMITTEE

ON

INTELLIGENCE,

PREWAR

INTELLIGENCE

S. REP . No. 1 08-301 , supra note 45, at 295 ("The in
telligence community's elimination of the caveats from the unclassified white paper mi
srepresented their judgments to the public, which did not have access to the classified
National Intelligence Estimate containing the more carefully worded assessments.").
82. See generally notes 23-25 supra.
83. See, e.g. , Terrence L. Chapman & Dan Reiter, The United Nations Security
Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 886, 886
ASSESSMENTS OF POST-WAR IRAQ,

(2004).
84.

See MIROSLAV NINCIC, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

1 1 8 ( 1 992)

(" [T]he electoral punishment for a mistaken underestimate of the Soviet challenge . . .
has typically been greater than the punishment associated with a misguided overestimate
of the threat.") .
See James L. Regens et al., The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare
85.
War, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 168 ( 1995 ) .
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acquiesce to the short time period for congressional decision
making, and to vote to authorize the use of force. 86
While the electoral incentives likely had real effects on the
behavior of Congress members, the reality of the perceptions on
which they were based is less certain. A troubling possibility is
that the legislators' deference because of their projection of vot
ers' support for the use of force may in fact have helped to form
it. That is, Congress members who thought the public would
react negatively if they questioned the Administration's pro-war
advocacy, and in particular the fact claims upon which the asser
tions of grave and immediate threat were based, may have read
the public wrong, or at least too strongly. 87 Debate within Con
gress or among members of Congress and the executive branch
is crucial to identifying the issues and establishing credible, ex
pert assessments of the facts upon which the public's opinion
formation about policy depends. 88 Although at a practical disad
vantage vis-a-vis the President, Congress has greater authority
than any other potential source of oversight to access and ex
amine the evidence presented by executive officials to support
their threat claims. To the extent that Congress members fail to
exercise their special oversight authority because they predict
that voters will punish them for doing so, public opinion may
"echo" their failure to engage in effective fact checking rather
than demonstrate that they would have been punished if they
did. Additionally, by approving a resolution authorizing the use
of force without the need of a further vote by Congress, that
body effectively truncated its own debate. While Congress
members could express opinions between their October 2002
vote and the March 2003 use of force, they would carry much
less weight, in the media and in the public's opinion formation,
than the President's advocacy, because the decision in Congress
86. See Elizabeth Drew, War Games in the Senate, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 5,
2002, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/dec/05/war-games-in
the-senate/; Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 1 1 8 POL.
SCI. Q. 389 (2003) .
87. See FRANK RICH, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 6 3 (2006) ("The polls, far
from rationalizing the Democrats' timidity, suggested that they might have won a real
debate had they staged one."); Fisher, supra note 86, at 403 ("Why were Democrats so
anxious about being seen as antiwar? There was no evidence that the public in any broad
sense supported immediate war against Iraq.").
88. As to "elite discourse" generally, see Zaller, supra note 38, discussing media
coverage. As to partisan cues, see Adam Berinsky, Assuming the Costs of War: Events,
Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict, 69 J. OF POL. 975, 978 (2007),
available at http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/war.pdf ( " [P]atterns of elite discourse - the
stated positions of leading Democratic and Republican politicians - will play a large role
in determining public support for war.").
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was over, and the perception and reality was that the war deci
sion was the President's to make.
The media is another potential source of oversight. Al
though members of the media have no legal right to access and
evaluate classified intelligence information that is superior to the
public, they have much greater practical access to information
and experts whose evaluations bear on threat assessments, and
they have professional responsibility to fact check government
advocacy.89 Despite their access and public responsibilities, most
media entities did not effectively fact check the Bush Adminis
tration's threat claims before the use of force.90 The generally
pro-war media coverage had a number of particular aspects. One
was that the media reflected or embraced the patriotism that
threat claims typically invoke.91 Another was that reporters in
cluded information and advocacy volunteered by top executive
branch officials, rather than digging for information or opinions
offered by sources outside the Administration or by lower level
employees.92 Reporting and commentary questioning the suffi89.

See

Marianne M. Jennings,

Where Are Our Minds and What Are We Thinking?

19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 637,
653-72 (2005) (outlining scandals at major newspapers and television stations where
journalists have failed to fact check information they disseminated to the public) .
90. Michael Massing, supra note 51; Buying the War (PBS television broadcast Ap;.
25, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/transcriptl .html ("I went
back and did the math. From August 2002 until the war was launched in March of 2003
there were about 140 front page pieces in The Washington Post making the Administra
tion's case for war. . . . But there was only a handful . . . of [opposition] stories that ran on
the front page." (quoting Howard Kuntz, Washington Post media critic)); Editorial, The
Times and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
("[W]e
com/2004/05/26/international/middleeast/26FTE_NOTE.html?pagewanted=l.
have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have
been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable
now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we
wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence
emerged-or failed to emerge."); Lorie Conway, Iraq War Documentaries Fill a Press
Vacuum, NIEMAN REPS., Spring 2005, http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.
aspx?id=101078 (" [T]hree network news presidents agreed that their news coverage
should have more aggressively challenged the Bush administration's reasons for going to
war.").
91. Some broadcast newscasters and commentators openly announced a duty to be
patriotic in their coverage. David Folkenflik, Fox News Defends its Patriotic Coverage,
BALTIMORE S UN , Apr. 2, 2003, at lD . Others tailored their coverage this way to meet
what they perceived to be their viewers' preferences. CNN produced different versions of
its war news for its United States and foreign audiences. Kaufmann, supra note 20, at 45
(noting that CNN issued a "cheerleading" version of Iraq War coverage for U.S. au
diences and that partisan news organizations will deliver the ideological slant their au
diences want).
92. A study of broadcast news prior to the Iraq War indicates that it quoted execu
tive department sources twice as much as any other source, and that these sources were,
predictably, disproportionately in favor of the use of force. See Matthew Guardino &
Virtue Ethics for a "Perfidious" Media,
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ciency and credibility of the evidence that the Administration
presented to support its threat claims did in fact exist, both be
fore Congress voted to authorize the use of force and, in greater
volume, before the war began.93 Nevertheless, reporting that
generated misperceptions about the Iraq threat predominated in
broadcast news94 and on the pages of opinion leading print publi
cations as well.95 Incentives by media sources and individual re
porters to get big scoops and publish high profile stories help ex
plain why selected pieces of raw intelligence information that
supported threat claims received prominent and uncritical cov
erage.96 A critique of media coverage of Secretary of State Colin
Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council
pointed out that media reports frequently presented unverified

Danny Hayes, Whose Views Made the News? (Apr. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/6/4/p266648_index.
html (unpublished paper presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association).
93. Much information exposing the weakness of the administration's evidence or
conflicting with its threat claims was available to the few journalists who actively pursued
it. Knight Ridder reporters published a series of articles carefully examining the execu
tive
department's
threat
claims.
See
generally
Noteworthy
Stories,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/128/. One, in particular, compared a series of official state
ments with available evidence and the judgments of unnamed officials. Warren P. Stro
bel, supra note 5960. This piece exposes most of the weaknesses in the threat claims, not
ing, however, that " [n]one of the dissenting officials, who work in a number of different
agencies, would agree to speak publicly, out of fear of retribution." Id.; Johanna
McGeary et al. , What does Saddam Have?, TIME ON CNN, Sept. 16, 2002,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171 ,1003240,00.html; McGovern, supra
note 22.
94. Kull, supra note 3 1 .
95. See Posting o f Max Fullmer t o The Buffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2008/03/17/the-reporting-team-that-g_n_91 981 .html (Mar. 17, 2008 18:29) ("In the
months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the reporters in the Knight Ridder Newspapers
Washington D .C. bureau were virtually alone in their questioning of the Bush Adminis
tration's allegations of links between Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction and
international terrorism."); Buying the War, supra note 90 ("We were under the radar
most of the time . . . . We're less influential [than the New York Times or Washington
Post, even though they potentially have more readers]. " (quoting John Walcott, one of
the Knight Ridder reporters)).
96. The New York Times in particular ran several front page stories during the cru
cial stages of congressional and public opinion formation, which repeated and gave cre
dibility to details used by the administration to argue that Iraq posed an immediate
threat. See Franklin Foer, The Source of the Trouble, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 21, 2005,
available at http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/features/9226/ (describing how Judith
Miller, a star New York Times reporter, became close to Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraq defector,
and administration sources, and created numerous high profile stories that promoted the ad
ministration's case for war). Judith Miller has since left the New York Times, and in 2008 be
came a contributor to FOX News. Paul J. Gough, Veteran Reporter Judith Miller Joins Fox
News, REUTERS, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49J80G20081020.
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allegations as facts, rather than qualifying them as being asser
tions in support of advocacy .97
Additionally, the decisions of Congress members not to ex
ercise their authority to fact check administration threat claims,
through inquiry and public debate, contributed to the lack of
critical examination of those claims in the media. As noted
above, Congress members have the constitutional authority to
access and examine most of the information that bears upon
threat assessment, and to publicize much of it. At least, they can
express judgments about its sufficiency and credibility, which can
challenge the authority with which executive officials present the
threat claims, and so present the type of "debate" about an "is
sue" that reporters are trained to present. That is, debate and
decision frame a newsworthy "story," and so, as congressional
inquiry into the Administration's claims "melted away," report
ers had to turn to less credible sources to balance coverage of
administration threat claims and war advocacy.98 Scholars have
reflected upon the challenge that this lack of debate among cred
ible authority figures posed to public opinion formation with re
spect to the Iraq War, since theory proposes that the public par
ticularly needs educated experts and partisan cues to filter
information with respect to foreign affairs.99 More than one ob97. Press Release, Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, A Failure of Skepticism in
Powell Coverage (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.fair.org/press-releases/un
powell-iraq.html ("Reporters at several major outlets neglected to observe the journalis
tic rule of prefacing unverified assertions with words like 'claimed' or 'alleged."') .
98. Stanley Feldman et al., Going to War: When Citizens Matter 7 (Apr. 3, 2008),
available
at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/5/2/
p266525_index.html (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association). See Guardino & Hayes, supra note 92, at 15-19 (in the
absence of domestic authorities offering anti-war critiques, journalists turned to foreign
sources, including Iraqi officials and citizens, as sources to balance their coverage of
views, even though these views were likely to be accorded less weight than credible do
mestic sources by American viewers).
99. Feldman, supra note 98, at 4 ("(F]oreign affairs provide an especially tough test
of citizens' ability to arrive at reasoned judgment independently of the influence of polit
ical elites . . . . The existence of disagreement among major political players is critical to
balanced coverage of foreign affairs and domestic issues because of the media's tendency
to attend most closely to the views of influential policy makers."); William G. Howell &
Jon C. Pevehouse, When Congress Stops Wars, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct., 2007,
available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/09/when_congress_stops_wars.
html ("Many studies have shown that the media regularly follow official debates about
war in Washington, adjusting their coverage to the scope of the discussion among the
nation's political elite. And among the elite, members of Congress - through their own
independent initiatives and through journalists' propensity to follow them- stand out as
the single most potent source of dissent against the president. . . . Whether the media
scrutinize every aspect of a proposed military venture or assume a more relaxed posture
depends in part on Congress' willingness to take on the president.").
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server has concluded that because the public did not have access
to this debate through the media that the "marketplace of
ideas," which is supposed to ensure consent to use of force deci
sion making
and in particular to limit the wars that democracies
.
engage m, fai· 1 e d .
Finally, an important accountability check on executive ad
vocacy with respect to domestic legislation is organized, affluent
opposition. Private organizations spend money to influence leg
islators and communicate with the public to oppose administra
tion advocacy. These private organizations employ lobbyists who
become experts in the facts and law that impact their interests.
While lobbyists of course seek to persuade Congress members to
act to further the policy goals of the organization that funds
them, the private resources devoted to the particular subj ect
area mean that lobbyists can do the hard work of collecting, un
derstanding, and communicating the meaning of complex infor
mation to very busy people for whom the issue is but one of
many they must address. That private organizations wield cam
paign contributions and other support that may enhance legisla
tors' electoral success can counter other incentives and spur
Congress members to take action to challenge facts or policy ad
vocated by the President.
Private organizations sporadically advertise and lobby Con
gress members against the use of force.101 However, there do not
appear to be private, affluent organizations that employ lob
byists on a continuing basis to collect, understand and communi
cate the meaning of threat assessment information to Congress
members and members of their staffs, or at least none with a fi
nancial incentive to question administration threat claims.102 Of
lOO

100. Kaufmann, supra note 20. See generally Cramer, supra note 22. See also A. Tre
vor Thrall, Framing Iraq: Threat Inflation in the Marketplace of Values, in AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR 174 passim (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K.
Cramer eds., 2009) (observing that "the most popular line of argument is that Bush was
able to induce a failure of the marketplace of ideas," but arguing that a "marketplace of
values" is a better way to understand how policy making should function).
101.
See, e.g. , Michael Crowley, Can Lobbyists Stop the War?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2007, at 6-54 (describing Americans Against Escalation in Iraq, a coalition brought to
gether by MoveOn.org to lobby Congress, noting that the group spent over $12 million in
2007, and that its members are in frequent contact with the staffs of House and Senate
majority leaders).
102. Military contractors can be expected to favor the use of force generally. Oil
companies can be expected to favor wars that make access to their product easier. Ano
tonia Juhasz, Big Oil's Last Stand, FOREIGN POL'Y IN FOCUS, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/big_oils_last_stand (Big Oil spends tens of thousands of dol
lars every year on lobbying the federal government, which is much less than the money it
spends on elections. "Oil Change International compiled voting records for the five most
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course, the lobbyists would not have the ability to access secret
information to engage in ongoing threat assessment and educa
tion for Congress members. Motivated lobbyists would, howev
er, have the ability to prod Congress members and members of
their staffs to demand and obtain threat assessment information
on an ongoing basis. Although they could not review the con
tents, they could motivate the process, inquiring about briefings
and publicizing that they happened, and providing the questions
to ask.
With respect to the Iraq War then, it is no surprise that
there appears to have been no organized, well funded private
organization that employed lobbyists that helped Congress
members and their staffs do the work of fact checking adminis
tration threat claims before Congress voted to authorize the use
of force.103 Some fact checking was done by private entities and ·
individuals. Research organizations produced some commentary
and reports that analyzed the evidence offered by the Adminis
tration in support of its claims.104 And, prominent individuals
with expertise and credibility, including officials associated with
the first Bush Administration, pointed out the dearth of hard
evidence offered by the Administration to support its threat
claims and questioned the reasons offered for the use of force
more generally.105

important bills on the Iraq War: the initial 2003 vote authorizing the use of force in Iraq
and the subsequent supplemental war finding bills in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. From
1989 to 2006, members of Congress who voted for all five bills received on average eight
times more money from the oil and gas industry . . . than those who voted against the
war.").
103. Opposition became more organized as the war progressed. A number of groups
funded advertisements against the 2007 troop surge. See, e.g. , Ryan Grim, MoveOn Al
ready Attacking Senators Blocking Debate on Surge, POLITICO, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0207/2659 .html.
104. See, e.g. , INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, IRAQ'S
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A NET ASSESSMENT (2002).
105. See, e.g. , Peggy Noonan, Time to Put the Emotions Aside, WALL STREET J.,
Sept. 1 1 , 2002, at A14 available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/
?id=l 10002249 (former speech writer to the first President Bush, asking for "hard data
that demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he is
readying to use on the people of the U.S. or the people of the West"); see also Brent
Scowcroft, Don 't A ttack Saddam, WALL STREET J., Aug. 15, 2002, at Al2, available at
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=l l 0002133; James A. Baker,
The Right Way to Change a Regime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at 4-9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/opinion/25BAKE.html (former secretary of state
James Baker warns that the United States should not attack Iraq alone); Mearsheimer &
Walt, supra note 68; IN SHIFTING SANDS (Five Rivers 2000) (Scott Ritter documentary
about the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq).
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In sum, both lack of access to intelligence information and
disincentives by the surrogates upon whom the public relies to
access and assess complex information that bears on policy deci
sions to inquire more thoroughly into executive department
threat claims led to incomplete oversight of the accuracy of the
fact claims that formed the core of the executive department's
use of force advocacy.
II. USE OF FORCE ADVOCACY, THREAT CLAIMS
AND THE QUESTION OF CONTEMPORANEOUS
ACCOUNTABILITY DURING THE FIRST YEAR
OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY
Although he inherited the conflict, Barack Obama is a war
president, actively engaged in assessing threats, and in deciding
upon and advocating for the use of force to address them. The
use of force in Afghanistan, against the Taliban, which aided al
Qaeda, which planned and committed the September 11, 2001
attacks, has bled into Pakistan, 106 and is likely seeping into other
regions as well.101 The troop commitment in Afghanistan has ris
en significantly twice during the first year of the Obama presi
dency.108 In September 2009, the President began a several
month deliberation process, which culminated in a decision to
increase troop strength in Afghanistan substantially. Immediate
ly upon announcing the content of his decision, the President or
dered its implementation. Both he and other executive depart
ment officials have made threat claims as part of a strategic and
coordinated communications campaign to persuade Congress
and the nation to consent to his chosen policy. Additionally, dur
ing this same time period, other threats emerged. Attacks
against United States targets - some aborted and some success
ful - unleashed a storm of inquiry into the accountability of this
Administration for its threat assessments.109 Although the com106. Peter Baker, Obama's War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0l/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html ( over 50 drone strikes
launched in 2009) ; Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, CI.A. Deaths Prompt Surge in Drone
War, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23drone.html ( over ten drone strikes in one month kill 90
people in Pakistan) .
107. Michelle Levi, Roundtable Looks at Yemen Terror Threat, CBS NEWS, Jan. 3,
2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/0l/03/ftn/main6049967.shtml.
108. See Barbara Starr, Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase, CNN, Feb.
18, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html; see also
Eric Schmitt, Obama Gives Troop Orders Be.fore Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 , 2009, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/world/asia/Olorders.html.
109. See Borzou Daragahi & Greg Miller, U.S. Casts Doubt on Bin Laden Claim,
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parison between the use of force decision making and threat
claims made in support of policy of this President as compared
to the last one must be imperfect,110 some insights can be drawn
as to whether the structures, incentives and behaviors that im
paired effective oversight have, or have not changed, with a new
Oval Office occupant, a new Congress, and members of the me
dia ostensibly committed to covering executive department
threat claims less credulously.
Aggressive and Persuasive Use of Threat Claims in Support
of the Use of Force. The Obama Administration has assembled
and operates a formidable advocacy machine, which it deploys
strategically and persistently to build support for the President's
policies.111 The Administration uses multiple media and different
forms of messages and appearances to find his audience and
make his case.1 12 The more traditional forms of communication
include print interviews, broadcast media appearances, press reL.A. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2010, at 13, available at http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/jan/25/world/la-fg-bin-laden25-2010jan25 (detailing the failed attempt to blow
up an American commercial jet for which al-Qaeda took credit); see also Posting of Jeff
Zeleny to The Caucus: The Politics and Government Blog of The Times,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/obama-pays-tribute-to-fallen-cia-officers/
(Feb. 5, 2010 16:43 EST) (seven CIA officers were killed in Afghanistan in a suicide
bombing); Ashley Powers, A Story of Shock, Chaos and Bravery Unfolds, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2009, at Al (attack on Fort Hood); A.G. Sulzberger & William K. Rashbaum,
Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, at Al
(guilty plea in plot to bomb New York subway).
110. The Iraq War decision required a vote by Congress to authorize it. U.S . CONST.
art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War."). The decision to in
crease troop levels in an ongoing war does not clearly require a vote. But see Bruce
Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, What Will Congress Do About Afghanistan ?, SLATE,
Dec. 9, 2009 (arguing that Congress "should repeal the open-ended 2001 resolution and
authorize Obama's 18-month surge through a new mechanism for ensuring the ongoing
democratic legitimacy of limited wars"); David Rogers, Anti-War Lawmakers Want a
Vote, POLITICO, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30087.html
("Anti-war lawmakers in Congress are pressing for an early vote on funding for new
troops in Afghanistan so that President Barack Obama's policy can be tested before
thousands of additional Marines and soldiers are sent into combat.").
11 1. S e e Ken Auletta, Non-Stop News, NEW YORKER, Jan. 25, 2010, at 38-47 (de
scribing the Obama communications operation and noting specifically that " [t]his White
House, like others, does its best to manipulate press coverage"); K. Daniel Glover, The
Cost of Controlling the Press, ACCURACY IN MEDIA, July 7, 2009, http://www.
aim.org/aim-column/the-cost-of-controlling-the-press/ ("Overall, Obama is spending
about 12 percent more for his communications operation than Bush - $4.97 million com
pared with $4.44 million."); Jennifer Senior, The Message is the Message, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 2, 2009, http://nymag.com/news/politics/58199 (the Obama Administration's
communications operation is "very disciplined" and "highly selective about access").
1 12. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, What About the Next 100? Obama in Ac
tion- Part Vll: The JOOth Day, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/obama_in_action_viii_043009.php ("Obama's Strategy of
Persuasion . . . He has used the unilateral powers of the presidency more vigorously than
any of his predecessors.").
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leases and the President's weekly address carried via radio and
the web.113 The Administration also makes use of technologies
that bypass traditional media to communicate with the public di
rectly, such as web pages devoted to promoting its policies,114 a
Flickr stream on which it publishes � hotographs,115 YouTube re
leases of interviews and speeches, 16 and Twitter posts of ex
cerpts.117 In addition to putting out a message, the executive
branch employs means to search out and quickly counter infor
mation that undercuts its policies.11 8 The President's chief of staff
holds a daily conference call with political analysts who regularly
offer "independent" media commentary.119 An end-of-the-year
review caused the Obama Administration to retool its communi
cations strategy in light of lessons learned during the President's
first twelve months in office. The honed strategy will emphasize
"disciplined messaging," in which "unhelpful themes [are] fil
tered out in favor of topics that advance[] the [President's]
goals," "quicker, more aggressive response to GOP attacks on
the president and his policies,"120 and "a return to the [relaxed,
1 13.

Thomas E. Mann,

From Campaigning to Governing: Politics and Policymaking

Administration,
BROOKINGS
INST.,
Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0421_governance_mann.aspx ("Obama has
chosen to err on the side of overexposure. Hardly a day goes by without his public pres
ence, including speeches, press conferences, and meetings with members of Congress,
CEOs, policy experts and ordinary citizens; exclusive interviews with network anchors
and the national press; new access to minority media and sympathetic bloggers; an ap
pearance on Jay Leno and a return to 60 Minutes; weekly trips around the country, with
extensive news coverage.").
114. See The White House Briefing Room, http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing
room. The President also has a Facebook page and blog.
1 15. Stan Schroeder, Obama On Flickr: The First 100 Days and More, MASHABLE,
Apr. 29, 2009, http://mashable.com/2009/04/29/obama-flickr/ (photos depict Obama in a
variety of situations: watching the Super Bowl in 3D, playing with a football in the Oval
Office, or being briefed about the swine flu outbreak in the Situation Room).
116. See Brian Stelter, Obama to Field Questions Posted by YouTube Users, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at AlO, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/0l/us/politics/
Olyoutube.html ("White House aides say the [YouTube) videos and webcasts are a po
werful 'force multiplier' for the administration's persuasion efforts.").
1 17. Senior, supra note 111.
118. See Auletta, supra note 1 1 1 , at 46 ("Reality Check" blog established by White
House to challenge false assertions); Posting of Macon Phillips to The White House
Blog, Facts are Stubborn Things, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/facts-are-stubborn
things (Aug. 4, 2009 06:55 EDT) (asking readers to pass along information if they "get an
email or see something on the web about health insurance reform that seems fishy").
119. John F. Harris, Power, Politics, Gossip on Daily Call, POLITICO, Jan. 27, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0109/18011 .html.
120. Not surprisingly, some view the Obama administration's persuasive messaging
techniques as heavy-handed. Reporters complain about press control, selective access,
and staged "town hall" events. Senior, supra note 1 1 1 (quoting long-time White House
correspondent Helen Thomas). The White House and FOX News have been at odds.
White House Escalates War of Words With Fox News, Fox NEWS, Oct. 12, 2009,
in

the

New

Obama
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out-of-Washington] backdrops" that were effective during the
presidential campaign.121
The Obama Administration has used threat claims as a part
of its strategic and coordinated communications campaign to
build public support for his chosen policy to deploy additional
troops in Afghanistan. The President's decision came after a
three-month, highly publicized decision making process. Much
anticipation and public conversation occurred during the Presi
dent's deliberations, with widespread agreement that, once the
decision was made, it would be his challenge to make his case
and "sell" his chosen policy.122 Persuasive communications by ex
ecutive branch officials have included formal speeches,123 Sunday
talk show appearances, 124 congressional testimony, 125 direct media
postings, 126 and documents delivered to Congress and released
publicly.121 In these communications, executive branch officials

·

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/12/white-house-escalates-war-words-fox-news/
(on September 20, the President visited all major Sunday morning talk shows except the
FOX Channel's. Anita Dunn, then communications director, called it "a wing of the Re
publican Party"); see also Brian Stelter, Fox's Volley With Obama Intensifying, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/business/
media/12fox.html. Some fault the administration's transparency efforts, particularly the
whitehouse.gov web page, as geared more toward "public persuasion than documenta
tion." Mann, supra note 1 13.
121. Michael D . Shear, Better Focus, Faster Response Part of Obama Communica
tions Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A06.
122. See David E. Sanger, Obama's Task: A Tough Sell on Friendly Territory, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/23sanger.
html; Obama Must Sell Afghan Surge, BREITBART, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.breitbart.
com/article.php?id=CNG.dflebb0b552b58e02cf23ff8b0dba97a.9fl&show_article=l ("US
President Barack Obama will have to sell his escalation of the war in Afghanistan to his
divided Democratic allies in the US Congress, Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
said.").
123. Brian Montopoli, Obama Lays Out New Afghanistan Strategy, CBS NEWS, Dec.
1, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/01/politics/main5855734.shtml (speech
from West Point announcing the troop increase); President Barack Obama, Remarks by
the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace
prize.
124. Dianna Heitz, Sunday Talk Show Tip Sheet, POLITICO, Dec. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30226.html ("Secretary of State Hillary Clin
ton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates headline this Sunday's television talk shows, as
they continue to make the case for the administration's strategy to deploy 30,000 addi
tional U.S. troops to Afghanistan and set a July 201 1 deadline to begin a military with
drawal.").
125. E.g. , Lynn Sweet, Hillary Rodham Clinton to Sell Obama Afghan Strategy to
Congress, NA TO, POL. DAILY, Dec. 1 2009, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/12/0l/
hillary-rodham-clinton-to-sell-obama-afghan-strategy-to-congress/.
126. E.g. , Posting of Jesse Lee to the White House Blog, The New Way Forward
The President's Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/0l/new-way-forward
presidents-address (Dec. 1, 2009 21 :35 EDT) .
127. See, e.g. , Annual Threat Assessment of the U. S. Intelligence Community: Hearing
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have repeatedly asserted as true that the Taliban, which is lo
cated in Afghanistan where force is to be applied (1) is offering
continuing support, including weapons, to al-Qaeda, which per
petrated the September 11, 2001 attacks; and that al-Qaeda (2)
possesses the weapons capacity to pose an actual and immediate
threat to the security of neighboring nations and the United
States; (3) possesses the means of delivering the existing wea
pons into neighboring countries, including the United States; and
(4) is inclined to attack other countries, including the United
States. These types of threat claims have been broadcast and re
ported in various media. One example is President Obama's
speech to the nation from the Military College at West Point an
nouncing his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan:
I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision be
cause I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanis
tan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism
practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked
on

9/1 1 , and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted

as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In
the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists
within our borders who were sent here from the border region
of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. . . .
And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakis
tan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek
nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that
they would use them.
These facts compel us to act along with our friends and
128
allies.

Additionally, officials have offered pieces of vivid imagery to
support their threat claims.
With this advocacy, the Obama Administration presents
facts about threats posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and al129

l l lth Cong. 16-19 (2010) (statement
of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence) (assessing threat to national securi
ty posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan).
128. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the United States Military Academy at
West Point, New York, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 962 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way
forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
129. Viola Gienger, Al- Qaeda Heads Terror 'Mafia ' with Afghan Nexus,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Dec.
3,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aqlbIZwRzjAM&pos=9# (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton as describing "a syndicate of terrorism,'' in which, " [a]t the head of the table, like
an old mafia diagram, sits al-Qaeda").
Before H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
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Qaeda for the purpose of influencing the public discussion and
conclusions about the policy the President advocates and seeks
the Nation to embrace. By presenting threats posed by the Tali
ban and al-Qaeda as actual, imminent, and potentially directed
at the homeland, the President and his advisors argue that con
fronting the threat by use of force is a necessity, not a choice.130
To at least some extent, administration officials have attempted
to present the justifications for war as simple and concrete, and
in terms that invoked patriotism and emotions, all important
elements to garnering public support for a costly foreign com
mitment.
The success of the Obama Administration's threat advocacy
to build consent to the use of force is uncertain. Troops are be
ing funded and deployed. Public opinion polls show varying sup
port for the policy over time.131 These polls generally do not ask
specifically whether members of the public believe the executive
department's threat claims or correlate belief in the truth of the
threat claims to support for the use of force. More certain than
the impact of executive department threat advocacy on the opi
nion of Congress members and the public is that the Administra
tion continues to communicate about threats and war events to
build and maintain consent to its policies.132 That this Adminis
tration and every one that follows can be expected to advocate
in this way means that it is of continuing relevance to compare
the past to the present to identify whether change has happened
to correct the structures, incentives and behaviors that allowed
executive department officials to make threat claims without
contemporaneous accountability.
Information Control in Support of Threat Claims. President
Obama has superior legal or practical access to the intelligence
information and opinions that formed the basis of his delibera130.

See, e.g. , Peter Baker & Eric Schmitt, War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at Al ("Robert Gibbs, the White House press secre
tary, said . . . that Mr. Obama's 'primary focus is on groups and their allies that can strike
our homeland, strike our allies, or groups who would provide safe haven for those that
wish to do that."').
131. See POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.
132. See Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 109, at Al (Attorney General Eric
Holder described the threat as one of the most serious since 9/11 : "This attempted attack
on our homeland was real, it was in motion and it would have been deadly."); Greg Jaffe
& Craig Whitlock, Afghan City Now Is More than a Battle, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2010, at
A09 (Marj ah chosen as site of major military offensive because it is a "symbol" that will
help the U.S. and military "define [the] narrative," which will "convince Americans that
a new era has arrived in the eight-year-long war and to show Afghans that U.S. forces
and the Afghan government can protect them from the Taliban").
Qaeda,
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tions on the use of force and he has indicated that he intends to
exercise that control to keep much of the information secret. In
his multiple meetings he reviewed existing information and re
ceived expert interpretation and advice from his advisors and
staff that is not available to Congress, the media or the public
generally. He directed the creation of new information to aid his
deliberations, and reacted strongly when information about the
content of the deliberations leaked in what the Administration
perceived to be attempts to influence the President's decision
making.133 The President did not request that the intelligence
agencies prepare a National Intelligence Estimate to aid his de
liberations on the surge.134 It is not clear which, if any, of the
"three dozen intelligence reports" and "thousands of pages of
documents"135 he directed be prepared as part of the process
have been released to Congress, or, in unclassified version, to
the public. It is unclear the extent to which this Administration
would resist explicit requests for information by Congress,
should it make them.136
133. Peter Baker, Inside the Situation Room: How a War Plan Evolved, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/
06reconstruct.html (noting that White House officials interpreted the leak of General
McCrystal's report advising a troop increase as "an attempt to box in the president" and
"were furious" when the general commented publicly that a plan less than the one he
recommended would not work).
134. Melvin A. Goodman, Obama's Weak Report Card on the CIA ,
CONSTORTIUMNEWS.COM, (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.consortiumnews.com/2009/
113009a.html. The executive department delivers some threat assessment information to
Congress on a yearly basis. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) delivers an an
nual threat assessment to Congress. See Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, supra note 127 (statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelli
gence).
Additionally, each president periodically publishes a document titled National Secu
rity Strategy of the United States of America, which explains the outlines and objectives
of all national security activities, including the use of force. See NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY (2010), available at, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf.
135. See, e.g. , Baker, supra note 133; Spencer Ackerman, Clinton Ties AfghanistanPakistan
War
to
Domestic
U.S.
Threat,
WASH . INDEP., Dec. 3, 2009,
http://washingtonindependent.com/69533/clinton-ties-afghanistan-pakistan-war-to
domestic-u-s-threat ("I am told by senior administration officials that the autumn Afgha
nistan-Pakistan strategy was informed by 30 intelligence products.").
136. See Walter Pincus, Renewed Veto Threat on Security Proposal, WASH . POST,
Mar. 16, 2010, at A04 ("The White House has renewed its threat to veto the fiscal 2010
intelligence authorization bill over a provision that would force the administration to wi
den the circle of lawmakers who are informed about covert operations and other sensi
tive activities."). The Obama administration's record on release of information is mixed.
Compare Ed O'Keefe, PO/A-Request Audit Shows Limited Gains, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2010, at A04 (report by the National Security Archive at George Washington University
indicates that during its first year, the Obama administration denied more Freedom of
Information Act requests than the Bush administration); Garry Wills, Entangled Giant,
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This superior access to the entire body of intelligence in
formation forms the implicit backdrop and grounding to the
threat claims the President and others in his Administration
make to persuade Congress and the public to consent to his poli
cy choice. With respect to certain claims, executive branch offi
cials rely on information that they do not reveal publicly to make
their threat claims, suggesting that they have more and better
quality supporting information than can be publicly revealed.137
They omit mention of dissent when presenting the Administra
tion's chosen policy and facts supporting it.138 To some extent at
least, executive department officials in their advocacy have
asked the public to embrace the truth of threat claims based on
trust rather than proof. It is difficult to gauge whether and to
what extent Administration officials may be using their authority
to classify and declassify information selectively for the purpose
of influencing public debate in favor of their chosen policies. Al
legations have been made that the Administration has released
information that could have properly been classified for the pur
pose of supporting its policies.139 More difficult to assess is
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/231 10 (noting the
administration's embrace of the "state secrets" privilege in litigation, its refusal to release
photographs of "enhanced interrogation," and its objection to use of documents in litiga
tion); with Associated Press, Agencies Ordered to Publish Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009,
at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/politics/09records.html ("The
White House instructed every federal agency on Tuesday to choose at least three collec
tions of previously undisclosed 'high value' government data and publish them on the
Internet by the end of January, an ambitious order to make the administration as trans
parent as President Obama had promised it would be.").
137. See, e.g. , Lolita C. Baldor, A l- Qaida Growing i n Strength and Numbers i n Afri
ca, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 1, 2010, reprinted in On The Defense Blog,
http://onthedefense.wordpress.com/2010/03/01/recruiting-boom-aq-sees-major-gains-in
north-africa-causing-fissure-in-already-fragile-local-governments/ ("Al-Qaida's terror
network in North Africa is growing more active and attracting new recruits, threatening
to further destabilize the continent's already vulnerable Sahara region, according to U.S.
defense and counterterrorism officials [who spoke on condition of anonymity] .").
138. It is quite clear that the President was presented with information during his
deliberations that conflicts with the decision he ultimately made. See Ken Dilanian, Black
Eye for U.S. Embassy in Kabul, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 2010, at lA, available at
http://www. usatoday .com/news/washington/2010-03-09-embassy_N.htm (leaked cable
from U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry questioning whether the military could meet its
timeline to turn Afghanistan over to Afghan forces) . Not surprisingly, this information
does not form a part of the administration's advocacy in support of the troop increase.
139. See, e.g. , Press Release, Senator Kit Bond, Bond Questions Motivation Behind
Disclosure of Vital National Security Information to Media (Feb. 4, 2010), available at
http://bond.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.NewsReleases&Conte
ntRecord_id=9A51D6C2-9928-C9A3-FAE3-68770D080E43 (letter to the President from
Senator Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.), Vice Chairman of Senate Intelligence Committee
alleges that administration released classified information about cooperation of a terror
suspect to defend its policies); Michael A Fletcher, White House Demands Apology from
GOP Senator over National Security Briefing, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010,
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whether or to what extent Administration officials may be sup
pressing release of damaging information of comparable sensi
tivity for the purpose of bolstering public support of policy.140
Top officials who had articulated facts and opinions that did not
support Administration policy have come to embrace the alter
native policy, at least, and state it publicly.141 Intelligence analysts
have not spoken out to question the truth of the facts asserted by
the President, which creates the impression that the facts he as
serts in support of his threat claims represent the consensus of
the intelligence community. Whether this is indeed true is diffi
cult to assess. Members of the Obama executive department are
undoubtedly targeting and communicating with private experts
for the . purpose of influencing the facts and opinions they
ct•
present m the me ia. 142
Although the structures have not changed to prevent this
President from using his superior access to intelligence informa
tion to support his advocacy, choices he has made, in his advoca
cy and in the process of decision making, narrow, but do not
eliminate, the extent to which he is contemporaneously unac
countable for his threat claims. With respect to advocacy, this
President does not rely as extensively as the last one on selected
pieces of raw intelligence information to prove the threats that
he argues justify the use of force. The Bush Administration re
lied upon multiple pieces of intelligence information to prove
several links in a chain that was necessary to persuade Congress
and the public to consent to the use of force.143 This President's
claims of certainty and unanimity are more limited and impor
tant links in the chain of persuasion have open source verificahttp://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/02/white-house-demands-apology-fr.html
(White House press secretary explaining that "no classified information was shared when
the administration briefed reporters") .
140. See Richard B . Cheney, Remarks t o the American Enterprise Institute, avail
able at http://www.aei.org/speech/100050 (May 21, 2009) (accusing Obama administration
of selectively declassifying Office of Legal Counsel memos that supported enhanced in
terrogation methods without also releasing information indicating that the methods
worked).
141 . Both Vice President Biden and Afghanistan Ambassador Eikenberry opposed
the troop increase but now support it publicly. Michael Rubin, The Afghanistan With
drawal: Why Obama Was Wrong to Insist on a Deadline, AM. ENTERPRISE INST FOR
PUB. PoL'Y RES., Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/101753.
142. Harris, supra note 1 19.
143. See, e.g. , Colin Powell, Secretary of State, Address to the United Nations Secu
rity Council, transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj .irq.powell.
transcript/ (Feb. 6, 2003) (presenting multiple pieces of intelligence as proof that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction and had the motivation and capability to use
them against other nations, including the United States).
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tion. Al-Qaeda, the core threat at which use of force is ad
dressed, has attacked the United States and open source infor
mation verifies its intent and potential ability to do it again.144
More controversial is the link between the danger to national se
curity posed by al-Qaeda and the necessity to use of force in
Afghanistan. The President and other executive branch officials
assert this fact with certainty. Intelligence information, which the
Administration has not released publicly, undoubtedly bears on
this judgment.145 We cannot assess its sufficiency, the unanimity
with which key assessments are agreed upon by intelligence ex
perts or the credibility of the sources upon which the informa
tion depends. To this extent, it is not possible with publicly
available information to fully assess the accuracy of the threat
claims asserted or the substance of the use of force decision that
the President made.146
Although we cannot fully assess the information that influ
enced the substance of the policy choice, the process that this
President chose to reach his decision provides some checks on
his own use of information control to support his advocacy. This
President actively advertised the deliberative process by which
the decision to increase troops in Afghanistan was made.147 Dur144.

Anahad O'Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite
N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 26, 2009 (Nigerian man arrested for attempting to ignite
an explosive device on a plane on Christmas day); Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note
109 (guilty plea in subway bombing plot linked to al-Qaeda); Charlie Savage & Anahad
O'Connor, Pennsylvania Woman Tied to Plot on Cartoonist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010
(woman going by the name JihadJane and linked to Al Qaeda was arrested in plot to kill
a cartoonist); Zeleny, supra note 109 (seven CIA officers were killed in Afghanistan in a
suicide bombing linked to al-Qaeda).
145. See, e.g. , Spencer Ackerman, supra note 135 ("Janet Napolitano, the secretary
of homeland security [sic], said that there was a significant risk that 'recent arrests' -like
[Najibullah] Zazi-mean that terrorists have been 'sent here from the border region of
Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit more acts of terror.' She said that Zazi's connec
tions to al-Qaeda's senior leadership in that region were 'at most one step removed.'
Watch this very carefully. How closely was Zazi actually connected to al-Qaeda senior
leadership? How anomalous or indicative is his case? What does his arrest represent
about U.S. domestic capabilities relative to those of the al-Qaeda 'syndicate'? And how
much information will the Obama administration release to demonstrate the scope of this
threat and these ties, as oppose [sic] to asserting them as self-evident?"). Zazi has since
pled guilty. Sulzberger & Rashbaum, supra note 109.
146. Open source information assessing the Afghanistan/Pakistan/al Qaeda threat
exists. See, e.g. , John Mueller, How Dangerous are the Taliban ?, FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 15,
2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/j ohn-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the
taliban; ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN, BELFER CTR., AL QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION THREAT: HYPE OR REALITY? (2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.
edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html.
147. Auletta, supra note 1 1 1 , at 41 (The administration gave interviews to three pa
pers detailing the Afghanistan troop increase deliberation process. The papers were the
New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times ) .
Device on Jet,
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ing this time, the President received information and deliberated
before commencing his persuasive advocacy in support of poli
cy.148 That the President took time, and reviewed many different
types of expert information and analyses and listened to a num
ber of different points of view provides some, albeit limited, as
surance that the facts he asserts with certainty are supported by
the best available evidence. The period of acknowledged delibe
ration also allowed for fact finding and debate outside the execu
tive branch, by Congress and in the media, before the Adminis
tration be� an its aggressive and persuasive advocacy in support
of policy.1 9 That actors outside the executive branch had notice
that a decision was to be made provided the opportunity at least
for independent, open source development of information,
which could compete with threat claims the Administration
would ultimately make.
More important than the question of selective use of secret
information in support of advocacy is whether the President is
exercising his control over the people who gather and analyze
intelligence to encourage accuracy independent of the Adminis
tration's preferred policy. This is very difficult to assess. The
flaws identified by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
in pre-Iraq War gathering and analysis included failures of ana
lytic tradecraft, lack of information sharing, poor management,
inadequate intelligence collection and a "groupthink" dynamic,
which caused intelligence community members to conform re
sults to a pre-existing mindset.150 The 9/11 Commission identified
these and other failings related to information sharing, rivalries
and coordination as inhibiting accurate detection and assessment
of threats.151 It is unclear the extent to which these structural and
managerial flaws have been effectively addressed.152
148. See Baker, supra note 133 (describing a process that included "a full range of
opinions and . . . contrary points of view" ) .
149. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a public hearing where it took
testimony of experts assessing the threat. Confronting Al- Qaeda: Understanding the
Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.,

11 1th Cong. (2009) .
150. S. REP. No. 108-301, supra note 45, at 15, 18.
151. See NAT L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S. THE 9/1 1
COMMISSION REPORT 407-410, http://www.9- 1 1commission.gov/report/91 1Report.pdf.
152. See, e.g. , Thomas H. Kean & John Framer, Jr., How 12125 Was Like 911 1 , N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2010 ( "Despite the best efforts of the 9/1 1 commission and other intelli
gence reformers, budgetary authority over intelligence remains unaligned with substan
tive responsibility. Turf battles persist among intelligence agencies. Power is sought while
responsibility is deflected. The drift toward inertia continues." ) ; Melvin A. Goodman,
Op-Ed., President Obama and the Intelligence Community: An Interim Report Card,
TRUTHOUT, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.truthout.org/1124095 (criticizing the President's
'

,
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Reforms have been happening, as have critiques of the re
forms.153 Many of the problems that detract from accuracy ap
pear to continue to exist.154 What is apparent is that it is very dif
ficult to make deep changes in practices within the vast,
dispersed intelligence apparatus155 and, because of secrecy, diffi
cult to establish benchmarks and public accountability as to the
effectiveness of changes made. What can be said about this Ad
ministration is that attention by opposition forces has been di
rected specifically at the effectiveness of the existing systems for
detecting and assessing threats.156 This Administration is aware
that it will be held accountable for its threat detection results,
which should make it attentive to the process. And there is some
indication that it is experimenting with new ideas and methods
to attempt to enhance accuracy .157
It is also difficult to assess the extent to which those who
gather and analyze intelligence conform their work to support
administration policy. Reports of the President's deliberation
process with respect to Afghanistan suggest that he requested
intelligence products to answer questions rather than support
conclusions. There is no indication that members of the Admin
istration are gathering information outside the existing intelli
gence process. There appear to be no reports like the few that
surfaced before the Iraq War of intelligence analysts feeling
failure to "take a strong leadership role in addressing problems of the CIA").
153. Compare Intelligence Agencies Reel From Attempted Christmas A ttack (NPR
radio broadcast Jan. 9, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyid=122394478 (Paul Pillar argues that the new structure is probably worse be
cause it adds two more stovepipes) with US Intelligence Reform: Improvement in Coun
ter- Terrorism ?, STRATEGIC COMMENTS, Oct. 2007.
154. See, e.g. , Kean & Framer, supra note 152 (procedural fixes that are worth un
dertaking are "enhanced screening, or installing body scanning technology, or coordinat
ing the software used by intelligence agencies, or instructing State Department personnel
to query the visa status of any person reported to be suspicious").
155. See, e.g. , Jane Mayer, The Secret History, NEW YORKER, June 22, 2009 (quoting
a White House official speaking of the change in Leon Panetta after he took over as CIA
director, "It's like 'Invasion of the Body Snatchers. '").
156. Peter Baker, Obama's War O v e r Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG, Jan. 17, 2010, at 33
("When the aviation screening and intelligence systems that Bush built failed to stop . . .,
[a] Nigerian with ties to Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen, from getting on a plane bound for
Detroit with explosives in his underwear . . ., a number of Obama's political opponents
blamed the sitting president.").
157. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Review Summary
Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack (Jan. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/white-house-review-summary-regarding12252009-a ttempted-terrorist-attack; MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL T. FLYNN ET AL.,
FIXING INTEL: A BLUEPRINT FOR MAKING INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT IN
AFGHANISTAN (2010), available at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/
Afghanintel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.
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pressured to produce information to support administration pol
icies. Incentives still exist, of course, for agencies and the people
in them to produce information that supports administration pol
icy and specifically that demonstrates that threats exist. So long
as the heads of the intelligence agencies report to the President,
they will have incentives to please him. Their career success will
be tied into the success of the President's policies, and they will
have incentives to support and defend it, which means that the
d �nge� otp olicy influencing intelligence gathering and analysis
will exist. Incomplete Oversight of the Accuracy of Threat Claims. Al
though the circumstances and political dynamics are somewhat
different,159 it is possible to make some observations about the
ability and incentives of Congress, the media and private entities
to oversee the accuracy of threat claims made by the Obama
Administration. With respect to Congress, the institutional dis
incentives to engage in vigorous oversight of intelligence activi
ties and use of force decision making remain largely the same.160
Congressional committees held a number of hearings after the
President announced his decision, at which executive depart
ment officials testified.161 It is unclear what classified informa158. See Posting by Michael Isikoff to Declassified blog at Newsweek, Brennan Plays
Unusual 'Attack Dog' Role, http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/02/08/
brennan-plays-unusual-attack-dog-role.html (Feb. 8, 2010) (commenting on appearance
of John Brennan, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on Meet the Press to defend Obama adminis
tration counterterrorism policies, noting that "using Brennan in this capacity could have
long term risks . . . [because] Republicans (and perhaps some journalists) will likely be on
guard for any sign he is slanting the intelligence for the president's political advantage").
159. The dynamics of partisan loyalty are shifted somewhat because it is a Demo
cratic president advocating the use of force. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 902
(describing the phenomenon of "counter-partisanship," which is that "presidents have
greater credibility when they choose policies that cut against the grain of their party's
platform or their own presumed preferences"). But see Patrick Egan & Joshua Tucker,
The Hard Sell, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-hard-sell
("Democratic presidents like Obama face a particular handicap when making major for
eign policy moves [including the use of force] .").
160. One change is creation of the United States House Appropriations Select Intel
ligence Oversight Panel, on January 9, 2007, pursuant to H.R. Res. 35, l lOth Cong.
(2007) as part of efforts to implement the recommendations of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the "9/11 Commission".
161. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, supra note 127
(statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence); Hearing to Receive Tes
timony on Afghanistan: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on A rmed Services, l l lth Cong.
(2009), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/12%20December/
09-65 %20- %2012-2-09.pdf (statement of Robert Gates, Secretary, Department of De
fense); U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Hearing Before the H. Foreign Affairs Comm. , l llth
Cong. (2009), available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/l l l/53829.pdf (witnesses in
cluded Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Admiral &
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tion, if any, was made available to Congress members as part of
this oversight and the degree to which individual Congress
members or staff chose to review and assess it. Much political
posturing and some factual inquiry occurred in Congress as the
decision was being made.162 Focused oversight of the decision,
however, could not happen since the President had not an
nounced the decision he would make. The President's control
over his own decision making process made effective congres
sional review of the decision he made difficult, since he began to
implement his decision to increase troops immediately upon an
nouncing it rather than inviting a vote by Congress on the deci
sion that he made.163
Events during the Obama Administration confirm the po
tency of threat claims, but indicate that their impact on political
debate and oversight of executive branch advocacy and action
may be different when the threat claims are made against the
Administration and not by it, to support its own policies. While
threat claims made by the prior Administration helped insulate
it from effective oversight, threat claims made in advocacy
against the Obama Administration contributed to political dis
cussion and debate and may have contributed to enhanced over
sight of intelligence gathering and threat assessment. In response
to the interception and arrest of a suspect allegedly intent on set
ting off a bomb on a plane bound for the United States on
Christmas Day 2009, Republicans and the former Vice President
most visibly, mounted a communications campaign advocating
that threats exist that the current President does not properly
acknowledge and address with appropriate policies.164 The forChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen) .
162. See Confronting Al- Qaeda, supra note 149.
163. The President asserted authority to commit troops without a vote by Congress
pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 1 15 Stat. 224
(2001); President Barack Obama, Remarks at the United States Military Academy at
West Point, New York, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 962 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://www. whi tehouse. gov /the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation
way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan ("Just days after 9/1 1, Congress authorized the
use of force against Al Qaeda and those who harbored them, an authorization that con
tinues to this day."). Some Congress members and others argue that a vote is required or
appropriate. See Perry Bacon Jr., House Liberals Force Vote on Pullout from Afghanis
tan, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/03/08/AR2010030803787.html (Rep. Dennis Kucinich introduces resolution and
achieves debate and vote on resolution to withdraw troops from Afghanistan); Acker
man & Hathaway, supra note 1 10.
164. See Cheney Blasts Obama on Christmas Day Plane Scare, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
30, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/12/cheney_blasts
o.html.
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mer Vice President's charges were perceived by the Administra
tion as potent, and it acted forcefully to rebut them in its com
munications, including deploying executive department officials
into national advocacy roles specifically rebutting charges that
the President and his Administration were "weak. "165 Congres
sional Democrats worried about the impact of the threat debate
on their prospects in the mid-term elections.166 Some degree of
oversight and change occurred,167 although it is unclear how
much if any of it can be attributed to the threat claims. What
seems more clear is that threat claims are more likely to escape
effective fact checking when they are made by members of the
executive branch, who also have the authority to control release
of the most credible information to support their claims.
Members of the media are ostensibly chastened after their
combined failure to effectively fact check the Bush Administra
tion's threat claims with respect to Iraq.168 The memory of the
recent experience, combined with different circumstances may
mean that the current Administration's threat claims may be
subj ect to somewhat greater media oversight. That this President
chose to engage in an announced period of deliberation, allowed
the media to frame a debate, and present credible and authorita
tive expert opinions on the facts and the policy before the execu
tive department began its advocacy.169 As with Congress, howev165. Obama A ides Hit Cheney Comments on Attempted Bombing, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/12/31/obama_aides_hit_
cheney_comments_on_attempted_bombing/; John Brennan, Op-Ed., 'We Need No Lec
tures', USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2010, at 9A; see also Helene Cooper, The Label Factor: Is
Obama a Wimp or a Warrior?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/0111 O/weekinreview/1 Ocooper .html?.
166. Ross Colvin, U.S. Spy Chief in Spotlight After Botched Plane Attack, REUTERS,
Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BT3S820091230 ("Republicans
portrayed Obama as weak on national security even as he campaigned for last year's
presidential election, and have sought to push that point before mid-term elections in
November, when they will challenge the Democrats' control of both houses of the U.S.
Congress.").
167. The President acknowledged that the intelligence agencies under his direction
had erred, Congress conducted numerous hearings to identify the errors and potential
reforms and changes to intelligence gathering structures and methods have been made.
Eric Lipton et al., Review of Jet Bomb Plot Shows More Missed Clues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2010, at Al; Mark Guardino, More Changes to A irline Security after Christmas Day
Incident, CHRISTIAN SCI. M O NITOR, Apr. 2, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/2010/0402/More-changes-to-airline-security-after-Christmas-Day-incident;
National Intelligence Director to Resign, CBSNEWS.COM, May 20, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/20/politics/main6503948.shtml.
168. Sherry Ricciardi, Second Time Around, AM. J. REVIEW, Feb./Mar. 2008 ("After
their credulous performance in the run-up to the war in Iraq, how are the news media
handling the Bush administration's allegations against Iran?").
169. See Jeff Zeleny, Deliberating on Afghanistan, i n Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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er, the deeper structures and incentives that operated to deter
effective oversight during the last Administration do not appear
to have changed. Some media analysts contend that the broad
cast and print news coverage is more supportive of the Adminis
tration's use of force policy than is public opinion. 17° Congress
members who oppose the war complain that their critique does
not get air time or prominent play in print.171 Administration
sources continue to dominate the news about the use of force in
Afghanistan.172 This Administration uses more direct communi
cations techniques that allow it to bypass reporters than the last
one, and through these media it can control the message that
goes out. And, military officials have acknowledged that positive
communication to the United States citizenry about the use of
force there is crucial to its success,173 and can be expected to do
all that they can to ensure that reporters deliver the favorable
coverage they need.
Some private, organized opposition to the use of force in
Afghanistan exists. As with the Iraq War experience, however,
these groups to do not have resources or expertise to examine in
detail the facts asserted by the Administration in support of its
policy.174 Research organizations, through publications and web
sites, can engage in some degree of oversight.175 Still, the fact that
15, 2009;

Where is the Afghanistan Debate? When Public Support Slips, TV Packs in War

FAIR, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3886 (Fairness &
Accuracy in Reporting critique on narrow media coverage that ignores public opinion).
170. FAIR, supra note 169 (polls are showing the American public is increasingly
more critical of the war in Afghanistan, but media sources are interviewing more and
more government officials who are in support of the surge).
171. Kennedy Lashes Out on Afghan War, Media Coverage, Fox NEWS.COM, Mar.
10, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/10/kennedy-lashes-afghan-war-media
coverage/ (quoting Congress member Patrick Kennedy about reporters' lack of interest
in a House resolution requiring debate on whether to continue the war in Afghanistan,
'"There's two press people in this gallery,' he shouted. 'We're talking about Eric Massa
24-7 on the TV? We're talking war and peace, $3 billion, a thousand lives - and no press?
No press?"').
172. Daniel Ward, Act Now, Think Later in Afghanistan; Media Support for 'Surge'
Comes Without a Real Plan, FAIR, Apr. 2009, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3753
(study of media coverage on the Afghan surge finds that most media outlets support the
surge and turn to Pentagon officials to discuss the issue).
173. Jaffe & Whitlock, supra, note 132, at A09.
174. The contrast between the private funds spent to influence Congress members
on the recent health care legislation and on use of force decision making is striking. See
Jeff Zeleny, Millions Being Spent to Sway Democrats on Health Care Bill, N. Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2010, at A01 (opponents of the President's policy spend over $1 1million dollars
on advertising in a several week period to influence key Democratic votes; supporters
matched that amount during the same time period).
175. E.g. , FactCheck.org, http://factcheck.org/ (run by the Annenberg Public Policy
Center of the University of Pennsylvania).
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advocacy for use of force consistently does not provoke orga
nized, affluent private interest in fact checking and advocacy
against the executive department's position, at least before the
commitment of forces is made, points out the heightened impor
tance of other sources of oversight in checking executive de
partment threat claims.
III. THE PROSPECT FOR FACT CHECKING EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT THREAT CLAIMS IN SUPPORT OF USE
OF FORCE ADVOCACY
Many observers have criticized the pattern of contempora
neously unaccountable executive branch threat claims support
ing advocacy that leads to consent to the use of force, both gen
erally and with respect to the Iraq War specifically.176 Many
reform proposals have surfaced. These focus on creating new
structures or rules to enhance the accuracy of the intelligence
product,177 to encourage executive branch officials to use intelli
gence accurately in their advocacy,178 and to require Congress to
exercise ongoing and critical judgment with respect to the fact
claims made by executive branch officials in support of the use
of force policy they advocate.179 If implemented and followed,
these reforms could help ensure the contemporaneous accoun
tability of executive department threat claims in support of the
use of force.1 80 The problem, however, is that mechanisms that
176. See Fisher, supra note 2; see also CATO INSTITUTE, CATO HANDBOOK FOR
POLICYMAKERS 1 10 (7th ed. 2009), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/
hb1 11/hb111-10.pdf (members of Congress "dodge the issue" rather than "take responsi
bility").
177. See, e.g, GOODMAN, supra note 53, at 329-56; Stanley Moskowitz, Uncertain
Shield; Review of Intelligence in Recent Public Literature by Richard A. Posner, 50 STUD.
IN INTELLIGENCE (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no3/Uncertain_Shield_7 .htm (book
review); Interview by Greg Bruno with Steven Simon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle
Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21 126/connecting_the_dots_on_intelligence_reform.html.
178. The Executive Accountability Act of 2009 would apply criminal penalties to
executive officials who knowingly and willfully make misstatements to promote the use
of force. H.R. 743, 1 1 1th Cong. § 3(a) (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.
us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill==hl 11-743.
179. MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION
REPORT 6 (2008), available at http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers/
report (chaired by former secretaries of state, James A. Baker III and Warren Christo
pher); Michael J. Glennon, The War Powers Resolution, Once Again, 103 AMER. J. INT'L
L. 75, 81 (2009) (describing proposals to reform the War Powers Resolution); Bruce Bu
chanan, Presidential Accountability for Wars of Choice, BROOKINGS INST. ISSUES IN
GOVERNANCE STUD. (Dec. 2008) (proposing a policy trial for use of force modeled on
the impeachment process).
180. Promising reforms include increased whistleblower protections for intelligence
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depend upon the will of government actors to enact and abide by
them are subject to the incentives that have led to the behaviors
that have in the past enabled executive department officials to
make threat claims for which they are contemporaneously unac
countable. Additionally, the judiciary cannot be counted upon to
enforce structures or rules that apply to use of force decision
making1 8 1 or require the President to release information that he
determines should be kept secret to protect the national security. 182
All of this means that, while new laws that effectively re
quired the many actors in the use of force advocacy and decision
making process to do their jobs responsibly might be most desir
able, they are also the least likely to be enacted, or implemented
in a way that makes them meaningful, at least in the short
term. 183 Without abandoning the hope of more comprehensive
reform, some piecemeal progress toward the goal of ensuring the
accuracy of executive department threat claims may be achieved
by approaching the problem from the public, or listener side, of
the communication exchange. Several key recognitions can help
those who must ultimately consent to the use of force - members
of the public- to evaluate the likely accuracy of executive de
partment threat claims, or at least to assess the extent to which
analysts, Cavanaugh, supra note 21, at 583; oversight of intelligence activities by a non
partisan entity such as the Government Accountability Office, House Moves to Increase
Oversight of Intelligence Community, OMB WATCH, June
15, 2010, http://
www.ombwatch.org/node/11071 , and increased and expert congressional staff focused on
intelligence and use of fo rce oversight, MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note
179, at 47.
181. MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 179, at 6 ("Despite opportun
ities to intervene in several inter-branch disputes, courts frequently decline to answer the
broader questions [] war powers cases raise."); Barry N. Sweet, Legal Challenges to Pres
idential Policies on the Use of Military Force, 24 POL'Y STUD. J. 27 (1996) ("The judiciary
has been accused of abdicating its responsibility when faced with legal challenges to the
presidential use of force (citations omitted). A review of these legal challenges over the
last 30 years demonstrates a judicial reluctance to make a ruling on the merits."); Michael
J. Glennon, A Conveniently Unlawful War, 150 POL'Y REV. 75, 90 (2008) (noting the "ob
sequious judicial posture" in war powers cases).
182. See, e.g. , Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 537 (noting "the judiciary's tendency to defer to execu
tive privilege or to related pro-secrecy claims, particularly where national security is in
volved").
183. See, e.g. , Glennon, supra note 179, at 77, 82 (noting that "Congress has already
enacted a law requiring the executive to give the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs such information as they may request,
without regard to classification, so long as the information relates to activities and re
sponsibilities within their jurisdiction" and that if "Congress truly wants to be included in
the decision to go to war . . . the constitutional means are available"); CATO INSTITUTE,
supra note 176, at 1 12 (" [L]egislative schemes designed to force Congress to 'do the right
thing' . . . have proved little more effective than a dieter's note on the refrigerator.").
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they are verified, as well as to exercise the power they possess to
prod surrogates with greater access or expertise in analyzing the
relevant information to do so.184
Presiden ts Speak as Advocates When They Make Threat
Claims. Government speech comes in many different varieties.
The same person, or entity, can speak at different times, in dif
ferent ways. The President, in particular, is a public servant who
speaks sometimes about facts as an implementer of national pol
icy, and other times, as an advocate for facts that support poli
cies that have not yet been embraced by the Nation's majority.
These different types of government speech call on listeners to
respond in different ways. The President speaks as an advocate
when he presents threat claims to persuade the Nati on to con
sent to the use of force.1 85 This means that listeners must evaluate
the claims he makes, and the evidence he presents, as advocacy.
While these recognitions may seem obvious, the Iraq War expe
rience suggests widespread confusion among listeners about the
President's responsibilities with respect to investigating and pre
senting evidence that bore on the threat claims he made. It is not
unusual that the incentives of a public servant who is also an ad
vocate will be mixed with respect to the presentation of facts
that bear upon the decision to be made. In the structured setting
of trial, a prophylactic rule can help counter these mixed incen
tives and address the imbalance in access to information in aid of
more accurate fact finding and decision making.186 Solutions are
184. Checklists can lead to concrete results even when their contents are very basic.
Cf Atul Gawande, Op-Ed., A Lifesaving Checklist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, 4-8 (not
ing "stunning" results of a simple five-point checklist reminder in preventing hospital
infections).
185. Presidents select information to present for the purpose of influencing those
deliberations in favor of their preferred policies, and they employ speech writers who are
professionally trained to use words and images that go beyond reason and logic to invoke
emotions for maximum persuasive effect. See, e.g. , BEST, supra note 17, at 6 ("One prob
lem [with the use of intelligence information by policymakers] might be that the process
by which White House speeches are drafted is less sensitive to the complexities of intelli
gence analysis than the policy-making processes of the National Security Council.").
186. In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutors bear
these conflicting responsibilities. On the one hand, they are to protect the public by iden
tifying criminals and obtaining convictions. On the other hand, they are "the representa
tive [s] . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995)
(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). Because of these conflicting
incentives, to effectuate the Constitution's due process guarantee, the Court has imposed
a prophylactic rule that requires prosecutors to deliver potentially exculpatory evidence
to defendants. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The prophylactic rule is de
signed, through the mechanism of information release, to "preserve the [constitutionally
designated fact finding arena], as distinct from the [government advocate's] private deli
berations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about [the policy matter to be
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less obvious in the context of public advocacy and decision mak
ing. At least, the recognition that threat claims in support of the
use of force are evidence in support of advocacy may instill the
appropriate critical response by public listeners, who as fact
finders must attempt, through congressional or media inquiry or
otherwise, to verify the threat claims that are made.
Process Can Provide Clues as to the Value of Intelligence In
formation Offered in Support of Threat Claims Even If Its Sub
stance Remains Secret. The President's control over the gather
ing and content of intelligence information is highly significant
to his ability to make persuasive threat claims in support of the
use of force. To a certain extent, the President simply cannot be
held contemporaneously accountable for the specific content of
the threat claims he makes.1 87 Nevertheless, a few basic under
standings about the process of reaching intelligence assessments,
which is special, and about the nature of the raw intelligence,
which is not so special, can be applied to executive department
threat claims to help narrow the range of their contemporaneous
unaccountabili ty.
Intelligence assessments are special because they use raw in
formation gathered in range and depth that private entities can
not rival, apply expert judgments that make use of experience,
expertise, and multiple perspectives, and reach assessments that
are as factually accurate as they can be without respect to how
they bear on policy choices. Certainly, the process does not and
cannot ever work perfectly. A process directed toward accuracy
can, however, work better than a process that directs fact gather
ing and assessment in support of policy. When the President
makes threat claims to obtain consent to the use of force, it is
possible, even without contemporaneous access to the content of
the raw information or intelligence assessments, to make some
judgments about whether the threat assessments asserted were
reached through a process that carries the best possibility of en
suring accuracy.188 While members of the public can ask these
decided.] " Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440.
187. See, e.g. , Glennon, supra note 179, at 77 ("Given the historical disinclination of
the executive to share information with Congress, it is unduly optimistic to believe that
[even a committee specifically charged by statute with the responsibility of consulting
with the President about the use of force] would ever have access to all the information
necessary to make an informed, balanced judgment in a crisis.").
188. Examples of relevant questions that can be answered with open source informa
tion include: When does it appear that the President decided to use force? Did the threat
assessments available at that time justify the conclusion reached? Did the threat assess
ments change substantially over a short period of time, and if so, why? Are there any in-
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questions and obtain some answers without assistance, they can
also use the power they wield over Congress members or mem
bers of the media to use their special access to information and
sources to examine the process by which intelligence information
is being produced and offered by the executive branch in support
of po 1.icy. 1 89
.
While the process of intelligence gathering and assessment
is special, the other important understanding is that raw intelli
gence presented outside the context of analysis is not so special.
Certainly, intelligence agencies have access to the widest range
of information and, combined, have the best ability to reach an
accurate intelligence product. But one important lesson of the
Iraq War experience is that the two activities of intelligence ga
thering and expert analysis must go together to produce a quality
product. Pieces of raw intelligence presented to non-experts out
side the context of analysis can be highly misleading if unders
tood to be certain proof of what they seem to show rather than
as the selected fact presentation of an advocate. In the con
trolled arena of trial, checks exist to allow the fact finder to as
sess the credibility and significance of the many pieces of raw
evidence presented to prove the case. Of course, public decision
making is not a trial, and the President has the actual or practical
authority to keep much of the intelligence information that bears
on threat claims secret. Nevertheless, some clues as to the credi
bility and significance of pieces of raw intelligence can be gained
by inquiring indirectly, not as to the specifics of sources or con
tent, but as to the process by which the information was ob
tained, deemed significant to threat assessment,190 and made pub
lic to support the President's proposed policy.

dications of unusual contact between policy makers and intelligence analysts? Are there
any indications that raw intelligence is being gathered or released by policy makers with
out having been vetted through the process that applies in the intelligence community?
More generally, has the President acted in a way that indicates confidence in the ability
of the intelligence community to reach accurate assessments, and indicates a continuing
intent to take actions to improve and rely upon the products it produces?
189. See Paul R. Pillar, Pillar to Press: Don 't Be Fooled Again, NIEMAN
WATCHDOG, Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
ask_this.view&askthisid=00181 (proposing questions for members of the media to ask
when executive branch officials use intelligence information to support their advocacy).
190. Relevant inquiries pertain to the degree of consensus within the intelligence
community and whether the most expert agencies agree with the assessment put forth in
executive department advocacy. See S. REP. No. 108-301, supra note 45, at 28 (noting that
Central Intelligence Agency analysts several times ignored judgments of more expert
intelligence units on the meaning and significance of raw information).
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Citizens Can Impact the Incentives of Surrogates to Fact
Check Threat Claims. Because incentives impact oversight of ex
ecutive department threat claims so substantially, it makes sense
to try to locate where they operate and to try to imagine ways to
impact them even slightly. When executive branch officials ex
aggerate threat claims, they depend upon the lack of ability or
incentive of others to engage in effective fact checking before
the decision to use force is made.191 This interdependency means
that any action to enhance contemporaneous fact checking will
impact the incentives of executive department officials to assert
unverified threat claims in the first place. One small, but poten
tially effective oversight activity would be to flip the successful
executive branch communications technique of quickly identify
ing misstatements and correcting them before the misstated in
formation becomes cemented in the public's minds.192 Some me
dia and web-based organizations do this sporadically.193 A more
sustained effort could potentially impact the incentives of execu
tive branch officials to overstate facts in their advocacy.194
Another point of entry for citizen action is timing. The shorter
the time period between when the use of force question is
framed for debate and the decision making, the less likely facts
asserted by the executive department in its advocacy can be
checked effectively. This recognition suggests that those being
asked to consent to the use of force be skeptical of claims of ur
gency, and demand the time necessary to ask questions about
the evidence presented and receive the answers.
One reason that Congress members make the choice not to
actively fact check administration threat claims because they cal
culate that the electoral punishment for opposing a successful
use of force will be greater than the punishment for failing to en
gage in effective oversight. This incentive is difficult to under
mine directly. An additional incentive, however, may be more
susceptible to change. Congress members seem to calculate that,
among the many choices they have about how to spend their
191. See SCHUESSLER supra note 20, at 21 (" [P]ro-war elites . . . take a calculated
risk that victory will be decisive [and so they] will be subject to little scrutiny about how
they maneuvered the country to war.").
192. Auletta, supra note 1 1 1 ("Once a story gains traction, [Obama administration
chief communications officer Anita Dunn] says, the Administration must respond quick
ly or 'rumors become facts."').
193. See, e.g. , FactCheck.org, http://factcheck.org/; see also Organization of News
Ombudsmen, http://www.newsombudsmen.org/what.htm (media fact checking site).
194. But see Brendan Nyhan, Op-Ed., The Fight Is Over, the Myths Remain, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A31 (research shows highly ideological listeners may believe
incorrect information more strongly after it is rebutted).
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time and public capital, the electoral rewards for diligent over
sight of executive department threat claims, and intelligence and
use of force activities more generally, are slight. Change requires
finding ways to make individual Congress members with the re
sponsibility to oversee executive department threat claims, and
intelligence and use of force activities, believe that their consti
tuents will notice if they do the job well or poorly. Obviously,
these methods, too, are hard to identify. But transparency and
education are tools that could alter the dynamic somewhat.
Some public education about Congress's oversight responsibili
ties could help change assumptions about what Congress mem
bers should have to explain. Congress members react to being
called out publicly for their behavior.195 When intelligence lapses
happen, Congress members with responsibility for oversight
should be named and asked to identify and explain the oversight
actions engaged in on their watch.196 On the carrot side, perhaps
there is some way to identify and reward hard work that particu
lar Congress members do, even if it is done behind closed
doors.197 All of these moves are difficult to accomplish, but the
Iraq War experience suggests that even slight changes in incen
tives can make a difference in how members of Congress behave
with respect to executive department threat claims.
Media incentives are financial, and the incentives of report
ers and media personalities is driven in large part by market
forces as well, which means that both are difficult for citizens to
influence to lead to more critical and careful coverage of execu
tive department threat claims. Pressure from affluent advertisers
may tend the opposite way.198 Many media entities police them
selves.199 And, media watchdogs help to monitor media coverage
195. See, e.g. , Carl Hulse, Senate Ends an Impasse Over Extending Jobless Benefits,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at Al3 (Kentucky Senator Jim Bunning dropped objection to
the extension of unemployment after other Republicans began to voice concerns on how
the block would damage their "political brand").
196. See, e.g. , Andrea Seabrook, Congress Under Scrutiny Over Plane Bomb Plot,
NPR, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=122372392
(claiming, without naming names, that several members of the 9/1 1 commission "say
Congress should be delving into its own mistakes, too" in failing to engage in oversight
that might have detected intelligence gathering and analysis problems that allowed the
attempted bombing to occur).
197. Media profiles are a possibility. See, e.g., Peter Baker, The Limits of Rahmism,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 14, 2010, at 36 (New York Times Magazine profile of Rahm
Emanuel) .
198. See Buying the War, supra note 9 0 (citing advertisers calling T V stations about
anti-war coverage).
199. Many newspapers have ombudsmen who comment on their paper's coverage.
See, e.g, Organization of News Ombudsmen, http://www.newsombudsmen.org/what.htm.
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of executive department advocacy.200 Even if it is difficult for citi
zens to impact media incentives directly, citizens can take some
types of indirect action to preserve the possibility of a media
check on executive department threat claims. One of these is to
preserve the possibility of professional, expert media fact evalua
tion and delivery as an alternative to direct executive depart
ment advocacy. Presidents commonly complain about "media
filters" and work to get their messages out to the public unmodi
fied.201 While reporters as a source of oversight are imperfect, the
Iraq experience and events during the Obama Administration
confirm that j ournalist intermediaries remain an important al
ternate source of information to add balance to the increasingly
ubiquitous direct media means of message delivery. Citizens can
realize this, and vote with their dollars and their readership to
preserve the content, even as the form modernizes.202
CONCLUSION
Too often Presidents have persuaded the Nation to consent
to the use of force by making exaggerated threat claims. Al
though some increased indicators of accuracy exist during the
current presidency, that the threat claims depend in part on se
cret intelligence information means that we cannot know for
sure whether this is again happening. What we do know is that
this President, like every one who came before him, is an advo
cate, which means he will craft his presentation of facts to per
suade the public to embrace his preferred policy. And the struc
tures, incentives and behaviors that allowed members of the
previous Administration to inflate threat claims remain largely
the same. While it makes sense to work toward legal change, as
an interim measure, it is necessary for the targets of executive
branch advocacy to be aware that the facts presidents present
will inevitably be inextricably intertwined with their advocacy,
that threat claims in support of the use of force particularly im200. See, e.g. , Nieman Watchdog, Nieman Foundation for Journalism, http://www.
niemanwatchdog.org/; FAIR, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, http://www.fair.org.
201 . Jonathan Martin, Obama Seeks Filter-Free News, POLITICO, Mar. 24, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20395.html ("It is the perennial hope of
presidents - especially early in their administrations - that they can escape the filter of
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pact the incentives and behaviors of entities that could oversee
the accuracy of those claims, and that such claims must be fact
checked somehow to preserve democratic decision making.

